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ARTICLES

CONDEMNING RELIGION:
RLUIPA AND THE POLITICS
OF EMINENT DOMAIN
ChristopherSerkin* & Nelson Tebbet
Should religious landowners enjoy special protection from eminent
domain? A recentfederal statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized PersonsAct (RLUIPA), compels courts to apply a compelling interest test
to zoning and landmarkingregulations that substantially burden religiously
owned property. That provision has been controversialin itself but today a
new cutting-edge issue is emerging: whether the Act's extraordinaryprotection
should extend to condemnation as well. The matter has taken on added
significance in the wake of Kelo, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
expansive view of the eminent domain power. In this Article, we argue that
RLUIPA should not give religious assemblies any extraordinary ability to
resist condemnation. We offer two principalreasonsfor this proposal. First,
the political economy surroundingcondemnation is markedly different from
that of zoning, so that broadening the law's protections beyond zoning to
cover outright takings would be unnecessary and ineffective. Second, the
costs of presumptively exempting congregationsfrom condemnation are likely
to be far higher than the costs of doing so with respect to zoning. In conclusion, we identify an important implication of our argumentfor the law's core
zoningprovision-namely, ourproposalinvites local governments to circumvent RLUIPA by simply condemning religious property that they find difficult to zone because of the Act. On the one hand, this gives local
governments a needed safety valve while, on the other hand, requiringthem
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to pay just compensation to religious groups. Our proposaltherefore suggests
a powerful compromise.
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INTRODUCTION

Should religious landowners enjoy special protection against eminent domain? That provocative question is driving the latest fight
over the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act'
(RLUIPA). Enacted by Congress in 2000, RLUIPA requires courts to
presumptively exempt religious groups from zoning and landmarking
laws that substantially burden religious exercise.2 It provides a powerful legal tool to congregations that wish to, say, build a parking lot or
expand their buildings in defiance of municipal restrictions. But does
it also confer the power to resist condemnation? If so, then churches,
mosques, and synagogues would gain a legal weapon that would
threaten the development of municipal infrastructure, economic
redevelopment, and even general regulatory power. If not, RLUIPA's
core zoning provisions would be defanged because localities that
found themselves unable to zone could simply condemn church property and avoid RLUIPA's substantive zoning provisions. In this Article,
we side with the latter position and argue that RLUIPA should not
apply to eminent domain. We conceptualize RLUIPA as a prophylaxis
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2006).
2 See id. § 2000cc(a)(1) (restricting government "land use regulation[s]"); id.
§ 2000cc-5(5) (defining "land use regulation" as "a zoning or landmarking law").
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against intentional discrimination, we offer a political economy
account of how such discrimination works in zoning as compared to
condemnation, and we propose that the availability of condemnation
is an important counterweight to RLUIPA's otherwise expansive protection. RLUIPA should not be extended to outright takings despite
the fact that-or indeed because-allowing unfettered condemnation
would effectively take some of the bite out of the Act's core zoning
provisions.
Individually, RLUIPA and condemnation are at the leading edge
of current but seemingly unrelated legal controversies. RLUIPA is the
latest installment in an ongoing battle over First Amendment protection, and it has rightfully drawn widespread attention, some of which
has been supportive and some of which has been highly critical.3
After Kelo v. City of New London,4 where the Supreme Court controversially reaffirmed its expansive view of the government's power of eminent domain, legislatures, courts, and commentators have wrestled
publically and with increasing acrimony over the dangers and appropriate uses of condemnation. A number of recent litigations have
forced these two otherwise separate issues together, requiring courts
to decide whether RLUIPA serves to prohibit condemnation of religious property. That issue implicates core judgments about the relationship between religious freedom and property rights. So far,
courts have come to inconsistent conclusions.5
This Article argues that RLUIPA should not be read or amended
to extend to eminent domain for two principal reasons. First, the
3 See, e.g., Mark Chaves & William Tsitsos, Are Congregations Constrainedby Government? Empirical Results From the National CongregationsStudy, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 335,
339 (2000) (documenting the frequency with which U.S. congregations have applied
for land use permits or licenses and concluding that "this form of interaction between
church and state is indeed an important point at which religious activity can be facilitated or hampered by government practices").
4 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Kelo sparked strong protest against the exercise of eminent domain generally. See Avi Salzman & Laura Mansnerus, For Homeowners, Frustration and Anger at Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A20.
5 See St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 641 (7th
Cir. 2007) (holding that RLUIPA does not apply to eminent domain because the
statute is silent on the issue); Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-cv3217, 2007 WL 2904194, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007) (holding that RLUIPA can apply
to eminent domain when condemnation forms part of a larger land use plan); Faith
Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254-55 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)
(reasoning that "land use regulation" and eminent domain are distinct concepts, and
that Congress likely did not intend for RLUIPA to cover both); Cottonwood Christian
Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1222 n.9 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (stating that condemnation proceedings fall under RLUIPA's definition of
"land use regulation").

4

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

85:1

political economy surrounding condemnation is markedly different
from that of zoning and landmarking, so that expanding the law's
protections to outright takings would be unnecessary and ineffective.
Second, the costs of presumptively exempting religious uses from condemnation are likely to be considerably higher than the costs of
RLUIPA's zoning protections.
Consider first the political economy dynamics. The best available
justification for the Act's core zoning provision depends on a series of
claims about the potential for religious discrimination in land use governance. Religious groups have been especially susceptible to discrimination in this country, according to this account.6 Governmental
discrimination based on religion is of course presumptively unconstitutional.7 However, religious discrimination can be hard for judicial
institutions to detect. Officials can easily offer neutral rationales for
discriminatory zoning-justifications that, if subject only to rational
basis review, may well withstand judicial scrutiny. Against this backdrop, RLUIPA functions as a prophylaxis, requiring close scrutiny of
all land use regulations substantially burdening religious practice precisely because of the risk that intentional discrimination may otherwise go undetected.8 Congress itself offered this justification when it
passed the statute.9
There may be some reason to be concerned about discrimination
by local zoning authorities. Discriminating through zoning is cheap
for local government decisionmakers because zoning rarely triggers a
compensation requirement and so does not affect the public fisc.1 0
This is especially important in small local governments that tend to be
both relatively majoritarian and sensitive to costs." Where these conWe do not directly engage arguments of statutory interpretation, preferring simply to show that a number of different textual readings are colorable and then to
argue for one of them based on normative and theoretical considerations.
6 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard, in LAw AND
RELIGION 200, 201 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) ("What properly motivates constitutional solicitude for religious practices is their distinct vulnerability to discrimination, not their distinct value . . . .").

7 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531-32 (1993); see also MARci A. HAMILTON, GOD Vs. THE GAVEL 92 (2005) ("[I]f a
zoning board or city intended to rid the community of a religious group . . . the
purpose would violate the Establishment Clause ..
Exercise Clause . . . .").

.

. It would also violate the Free

8 See infra Part II.A.
9 See HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 85, 87.
10 Id. at 92-93 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)).
11 See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments
and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1645-52 (2006) (arguing that small
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ditions hold, officials who want to discriminate-for whatever reason-are likely to be drawn to zoning because it will allow them to
effectively exclude religious groups at no expense.
By these lights, discrimination in zoning may be hard to uncover
for certain structural reasons as well. Local zoning authorities are
often governed by vague standards and have tremendous discretion. 12
Furthermore, they frequently provide only cursory written findings
supporting their decisions, if any at all.13 It is, of course, an open and
contested empirical question whether such discrimination is actually
commonplace. It may well not be sufficiently widespread to justify
RLUIPA's broad protections. 14 Nevertheless, the strongest story that
can be told in support of RLUIPA is that a prophylactic rule is needed
because discrimination is so hard to unearth in the zoning context.
Condemnation simply does not present the same opportunity for
unchecked discrimination. This is so in part because the constitutional necessity of just compensation means that condemnation will
always present government decisionmakers with some financial costs
to consider.1 5 Discrimination is therefore literally more expensive.
That does not necessarily mean that discrimination will comprise a
local governments tend to be sensitive to costs because they are dominated by local
homeowners who must pay for the costs through property taxes).
12 See Douglas Laycock, State RPRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
755, 774 (1999).
13 The extent to which zoning decisions require written findings of fact remains a
subject of controversy, although reforms since the 1950s have increased the formality
of quasi-judicial zoning decisions. See David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisaland Recommendationsfor Reform of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L.
279, 301-04 (2004). Many state statutes now require written findings, and most commentators agree that written findings are not only good practice but should be
required. See 101A C.J.S. Zoning & Land Planning§ 328 (2009) (reviewing state statutes and judicial interpretations of writing requirement). Still, the relative informality
of zoning decisions, and in particular the variance process, remains an ongoing concern for courts and commentators alike. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627
So. 2d 469, 476 (Fla. 1993) (holding that formal findings by the zoning board are not
required); see also Thomas G. Pelham, Quasi-JudicialRezonings: A Commentary on the
Snyder Decision and the Consistency Requirement, 9 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 243, 286-90
(1994) (criticizing Snyder). Zoning decisions are still sometimes made without written
findings, either in violation of state statutes or because the state statute does not
explicitly require such findings.
14 See infra note 85 (reviewing the weak empirical evidence of discrimination).
15 This claim need not rely on a stylized vision of governments as rational economic actors, a view that has appropriately come under increasing attack. See Serkin,
supra note 11, at 1666-70 (describing criticisms of traditional economic accounts of
government decisionmaking). So long as economic costs are translated into political
costs in any way-whatever the mechanism and no matter how much-compensation
will create some political pressure.
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smaller proportion of outright takings, as compared to zoning actions,
but it does suggest a lower absolute level of antireligious targeting in
condemnation. Bias is also likely to be more politically costly. Condemnation presents a poorer climate for discrimination because eminent domain has considerable political valence, as Kelo
demonstrated.1 6 Its exercise tends to be highly visible.17 Because of
those high costs-both economic and political-condemnation is usually the option of last resort for local governments.18 Therefore, a
prophylactic measure is far less attractive in the context of eminent
domain because it would stymie less discrimination on the basis of
religion. Put differently, it would deliver fewer benefits.
Our second rationale considers the costs of applying RLUIPA to
condemnation. If RLUIPA were free, some might argue for
extending its protection to condemnation despite its questionable
benefits, on the theory that more protection against bias is always better. Undoubtedly, the kinds of political pressures that arise when the
government condemns property will not necessarily prevent condemnation, even when untoward. Religious condemnees do not always
win these political fights, and therefore a prophylactic approach
might seem appropriate for condemnation, too. However, not only is
the risk of discrimination lower for condemnation than zoning, but
the costs of RLUIPA's prophylactic protections are much higher.
Property rights and regulatory power are, in this context, locked in a
zero-sum game: increasing religious groups' ability to resist condemnation comes at the expense of legitimate government action.

16 See Salzman & Mansnerus, supra note 4.
17 The lack of state and national data makes it extremely difficult to assess the
frequency of eminent domain in this country. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILIrY OFFICE,
GAO-07-08, EMINENT DOMAIN 13 (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http:/
/vww.gao.gov/new.items/d0728.pdf. Impressionistically, condemnation appears to
be far less common than zoning and other land use controls, which pervade every
major metropolitan area except Houston. See Bill Schadewald, The Only Major U.S.
City Without Zoning, Hous. Bus. J., Apr. 7, 2006, http://houston.bizjournals.com/
houston/stories/2006/04/10/editoriall.html?page=1 (describing an April Fool's
joke of announcing Houston's first zoning ordinance). There is, however, tremendous variation in the use of eminent domain by states and municipalities, making
concrete numbers impossible to find.
18 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 69 (1995); Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1412, 1441
(2006); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected PoliticalEconomy of Eminent Domain, 105
MIcH. L. REv. 101, 129 (2006) ("[A] number of state and federal laws make formal
condemnation proceedings a disfavored last resort."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 80 (1986).
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Admittedly, providing special protection against zoning is potentially quite costly, too. Religious assemblies may well be able to erect
buildings that violate a local government's bulk limits. They may
increase traffic, decrease parking, and draw a steady influx of outsiders into a community.1 9 While many religious land uses may bring
positive value to a community, some will not, depending on the particular use and on the particular community. Limiting a local government's zoning authority can reduce its capacity to address harms
when they occur.
Yet as high as these costs may be, the drawbacks of limiting governments' condemnation power are potentially even more serious. If
officials cannot assemble religious property, they may have to choose
suboptimal locations for core municipal facilities like schools, hospitals, and parks. 20 They may even have to divert roads, railroads, and
other infrastructure. Public-private partnerships to develop depressed
or blighted areas may also become difficult if not impossible
(although some will find that to be a happy result). Indeed, it is not
utterly farfetched to imagine a religious group becoming complicit in
stopping a large-scale development project by acquiring some property in the target footprint. 2 1 More generally, nothing prevents a
religious group from using RLUIPA to extract holdout value from the
government at the expense of local taxpayers. As costs of land assembly and acquisition go up, and the benefits go down, chances increase
that certain public projects will not happen at all. Applying RLUIPA
to condemnation would have far-reaching consequences indeedconsequences that are unnecessary and unjustifiable given the
decreased benefits of using a prophylactic rule for condemnation,
which has a markedly different political economy.
Our argument has an interesting and important implication for
the core zoning provisions of RLUIPA. Namely, it invites local governments that find RLUIPA's zoning restrictions overly burdensome to
condemn the property instead. We would actually welcome this kind
of strategic behavior, partly because we believe that political checks on
the exercise of eminent domain will be sufficient to thwart much discrimination-and that the cost of imposing a prophylactic rule to prevent any remaining bias would be unacceptably high. Our proposal
therefore offers a kind of compromise in the battle over RLUIPA's
19 See HAMILTON, supranote 7, at 99-104 (describing the effects of religious land
use on communities).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 156-60 (citing examples).
21 Cf Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251-52
(W.D.N.Y. 2005) (recounting an instance where a church bought property after the
town had announced condemnation plans).
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zoning protections. On the one hand, local governments would
retain a safety valve that could relieve some of the most serious pressure on RLUIPA. On the other hand, those who believe congregations require special protection in this area could exact compensation
from governments that wished to use condemnation to implement
zoning policy. While religious groups would not continue to enjoy
property rule protection against much zoning under our proposal,
they would retain something like liability rule protection. That
change would shift some power back into the hands of local governments and might actually facilitate compromise.
Part I of this Article describes the unsettled and unsatisfactory
state of the law regarding whether RLUIPA should apply to condemnation. Part II first offers a plausible justification for RLUIPA's core
zoning provisions, namely that they provide needed prophylaxis
against discrimination in local land use decisionmaking. It then distinguishes the political economy of zoning from that of eminent
domain, and it argues that the greater economic cost and political
salience of condemnation weakens even the best available justifications for the law when it comes to outright takings. Part II closes by
considering some of the costs of applying RLUIPA to condemnation,
costs that go even beyond the significant restrictions that the statute
places on local zoning power. Finally, Part III points out that under
our proposal, religious landowners would enjoy only something
resembling liability rule protection against much zoning, despite the
fact that RLUIPA purports to provide property-rule protection.
Because municipalities can always condemn property, subject only to
ordinary constitutional limitations, they may accomplish many legitimate land use objectives, so long as they are willing to pay just compensation and bear the procedural costs.
I.

AN UNSETTLED QUESTION

RLUIPA provides that "[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that ...
[its action] is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest." 22
The statute further defines a land use regulation as "a zoning or
landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or
restricts a claimant's use or development of land."2 3 Few courts or
commentators have yet paid much attention to the question of
22
23

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006).
Id. § 2000cc-5(5).
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whether that language ought to restrict local governments' condemnation power.
Early pronouncements seem to have distributed themselves
among three positions, each of which relies on a plausible reading of
the statute. The only point on which these competing interpretations
agree is that the text is ambiguous regarding its applicability to eminent domain. One straightforward interpretation is that RLUIPA
always applies to condemnation (the maximalist position). At least
one court and one prominent expert have endorsed this approach.2 4
Moreover, in 2006 Senator Edward Kennedy circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter and draft bill that would have amended RLUIPA to
explicitly extend its scope so that it unambiguously would cover eminent domain. 25
Another reading, which would apply RLUIPA only to certain
instances of eminent domain, has gained a significant following.
Adherents argue that, at the very least, a presumption of illegality
ought to attach when the condemnation is sufficiently intertwined
with zoning or landmarking, the Act's primary targets (the intermediate position). On this reading, for instance, courts should carefully
scrutinize a local government's exercise of its power of eminent
domain when it seems as if officials are attempting to condemn a parcel of land owned by a religious entity precisely in order to evade
RLUIPA's zoning provisions, which otherwise would make it difficult
or impossible for them to regulate.2 6 A few early commentators have
contended that the statute should apply in such instances and several
24 See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1222 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions
TargetingFirst Amendment Land Uses, 69 Mo. L. REv. 653, 670 (2004) ("[A]ny eminent
domain action can likely be traced to a local government's comprehensive plan or
zoning system . . . ."); Matthew Baker, Note, RLUIPA and Eminent Domain: Probing the
Boundaries of Religious Land Use Protection, 2008 BYU L. REv. 1213, 1234-42 (arguing
based on Congressional intent that RLUIPA should apply to eminent domain).
25 See Marci Hamilton, Churches and Eminent Domain: A Move in Congress to Once
Again Make ChurchesPrivilegedLandowners, FINDLAW'S WIT, Aug. 10, 2006, http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/hamilton/2006081 0.html.
26 For instance, a mosque in NewJersey recently submitted a site plan application
in order to build a larger house of worship for its growing congregation on a piece of
undeveloped property that it had purchased. See Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of
Wayne, No. 06-cv-3217, 2007 WL 2904194, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007). Subsequently,
the local government initiated condemnation proceedings, claiming it required the
property for its open space program. Id. at *3. That prompted the U.S. Department
ofJustice to file a brief arguing that the township had deployed its power of eminent
domain, in effect, to defeat the zoning permit. Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 28-30, Albanian Associated Fund, No. 06-cv-3217 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007). DOJ argued that RLUIPA
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courts have adopted a similar intermediate approach, at least in
dicta.2 7 This solution seems sensible and consequently it has attracted
its share of advocates.
In this Article, however, we argue that it is mistaken. Instead, we
contend that RLUIPA's presumption of illegality should not attach to
local governments' exercise of eminent domain (the minimalist position). In this Part, we describe these three positions more fully. In
the remainder of the Article, we argue in favor of a minimalist position, namely that the Act's presumption of illegality should never be
triggered by a local government's exercise of its power of eminent
domain.
A.

Maximalism

Among those who have argued that RLUIPA does or should
always apply to condemnation, perhaps the most important was Senator Kennedy, who proposed clarifying that the Act's provisions extend
to instances of eminent domain.2 8 An original sponsor of RLUIPA,
Senator Kennedy may well have had the political stature on this issue
to write a maximalist reading of RLUIPA into law. He would have
amended the definitional section of the existing law, so that exercises
of eminent domain would have qualified as "land use regulations" that
triggered the Act's presumption of illegality. 2 9
There is some support for this view in the case law already. In
fact, the first court to take a position on the question indicated that
RLUIPA does apply to condemnation actions, even in its present
form.30 The dispute concerned the Cottonwood Christian Center, a
nondenominational church with over 5000 members. Continuous
growth had pushed the group to purchase a plot of land in Cypress,
California for the purpose of building a large campus that would
should be available at least where the government attempts to condemn a prop-rty in
order to effectively defeat a zoning permit.
27 See infra Part I.C.
28 See Hamilton, supra note 25.
29 See id. With regard to interpretation of the existing statute, Senator Kennedy's
proposal could cut either way, of course. It could either signal that the current language does not sufficiently cover eminent domain, or it could serve as evidence that
Congress originally meant RLUIPA to apply to condemnation, and now is simply seeking to clarify that intent. Again, we do not focus here on arguments of legislative
intent. Rather, we observe that any of the three available readings are plausible interpretations of the Act's current language and we argue for minimalism as the most
attractive of these as a normative and theoretical matter.
30 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1222 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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include not only a house of worship, but also a variety of auditoriums,
classrooms, day care centers, and the like. Cypress denied the church
a conditional use permit (CUP), which would have been required
under local zoning laws before the church could erect its new
campus.3 1
Interesting for our purposes is what happened next: the town
filed an action to condemn the property. It said that condemnation
was necessary because the church's plot happened to fall within a
larger blighted area, for which the town had formulated a redevelopment plan anchored around a Costco retail store. 2 Cottonwood
sued, alleging a violation of RLUIPA, among other illegalities, and a
federal court applied the Act's compelling interest test. While the
court's first justification for applying heightened scrutiny was that the
denial of a CUP plainly triggered RLUIPA's core zoning provision,3 3
the district judge also indicated (in dicta) that even if only the condemnation action had been at issue, the Act's definition of "land use
regulation" should have been read to include Cypress's exercise of
eminent domain as part of its larger redevelopment plan for the
area. 34 Under a broad reading of that position, many instances of
eminent domain would trigger the law's requirement that the government justify its actions by showing a compelling interest and narrow
tailoring, because condemnation actions are often undertaken in relation to larger zoning schemes.3 5
31 Id. at 1211-14.
32 See id. at 1211 (describing the Los Alamitos Race Track and Golf Course Redevelopment Project).
33 Id. at 1222.
34 Id. at 1222 n.9. The court's textual argument led off by observing that RLUIPA
defines "land use regulation" to mean a zoning or landmarking law "that limits or
restricts the claimant's use or development of land." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5(5) (2006)). It then reasoned that the city's condemnation action was based on a
zoning system that "would unquestionably 'limit[ ] or restrict[ ]' Cottonwood's 'use
or development of land."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc5(5)).
35 Cottonwood's dictum has been read in that broad manner by other courts, as
well as by observers. See, e.g., St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502
F.3d 616, 641 (7th Cir. 2007) (disapproving of the Cottonwood dicta that suggested
"eminent domain is always and inevitably a land use regulation under RLUIPA"); see
also Saxer, supra note 24, at 670 ("As the Cottonwood decision indicates, any eminent
domain action can likely be traced to a local government's comprehensive plan or
zoning system and can thus be considered the government's application of a zoning
law or landmarking law, subject to RLUIPA.").
One other court may have subscribed to a reading of Cottonwood that is nearly as
broad. A judge in the District of New Jersey applied RLUIPA to an outright taking
because the condemnation was "merely a method of implementation" of an open
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At least one scholar has taken this position as well. In the first
full-length article on the question, Professor Saxer argues that courts
should closely scrutinize eminent domain actions against churches
and other religious entities, with the aim of uncovering any impermissible governmental motive.3 6 In fact, Saxer believes that exercises of
eminent domain should trigger greater judicial suspicion than other
forms of land use regulation because the required payment of just
compensation may be sufficient to defeat a religious entity's claim that
it has been substantially burdened-a threshold showing that is
required in order to activate RLUIPA's presumption of illegality.3 7
She also believes that the maximalist reading best fits RLUIPA's text
and legislative history.3 8
Despite these early endorsements, the tide may have begun to
turn against the maximalist position. More common today is the
intermediate view that RLUIPA's presumption should be triggered
only when the government's initiation of an eminent domain action
against a religious entity is sufficiently closely tied to its core zoning
and landmarking activities. Before examining that position, however,
we briefly review the scarce support that minimalism has generated so
far.
B.

Minimalism

A second view is that RLUIPA never applies to condemnationthe proposal that we advance in this Article. A few courts and commentators have endorsed minimalism, but they have offered reasons
that differ from our political economy rationale.
Most prominently, the Seventh Circuit arguably took this position
in a case concerning a planned expansion of O'Hare International
Airport in Chicago.39 As part of that plan, the city announced that it
space plan, which was "clearly" a land use regulation. Albanian Associated Fund v.
Twp. Of Wayne, No. 06-cv-3217, 2007 WL 2904194, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
36 See Saxer, supra note 24, at 694-95 ("Whenever the government uses eminent
domain to restrict religious freedom, such condemnations should be subject to strict
scrutiny review if they substantially burden religious exercise. Under RLUIPA, religious exercise is defined to include the use of land; thus, whenever the government
uses eminent domain to deny the landowner a right to use the property, such an
action constitutes a substantial burden on that use and is subject to strict scrutiny.").

A student note took a similar position. See G. David Mathues, Note, Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and Eminent Domain After Kelo, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1657
(2006).

37
38
39

Saxer, supra note 24, at 673-74, 695.
Id. at 668-70.
St. John's United Church of Christ, 502 F.3d at 641-42.

2009)]

CONDEMNING

RELIGION

13

would condemn a wide swath of properties, including the St. Johannes
cemetery owned by St. John's United Church of Christ. Under the
plan, the cemetery was to be relocated and compensation paid to the
church. St. John's resisted and filed a federal action, arguing inter
alia that the condemnation plan violated RLUIPA, but the Seventh
Circuit ultimately rejected that argument. 40 The court noted that
"zoning and eminent domain are 'two distinct concepts' that involve
land 'in very different ways"' 4 1 and concluded that "if Congress had
wanted to include eminent domain within RLUIPA, it would have said
something." 4 2
Among commentators, minimalism is also uncommon. Perhaps
it would be defended by Professor Hamilton, who has suggested in a
blog post that extending RLUIPA's presumption of illegality to eminent domain actions that sweep in sacred property would be unnecessary and indeed harmful.4 3 According to her, there is scant evidence
that special protection is needed against religious discrimination in
condemnation. 44 To the contrary, Hamilton believes that the Act's
core zoning provisions are already causing significant harm and
should not lightly be extended. 4 5 Aside from Hamilton's post, the
only other scholarly support for the minimalist position comes from a
student note, which contends that special protection against condemnation is unnecessary because eminent domain actions do not involve
the sort of individualized, case-by-case review of particular parcels of
land that is most likely to allow for antireligious discrimination.4 6
While we agree with these authors that RLUIPA ought not to
apply to condemnation, their rationales differ significantly from our
political economy story. Hamilton's post seems to be predicated on
an empirical and normative claim that the Act's central zoning and
40 The panel was divided, but not on the RLUIPA issue. Judge Ripple dissented
on a different question, namely whether the state RFRA had permissibly been
amended to exempt the O'Hare project. See id. at 642-43 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 640 (quoting Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d
250, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)).
42 Id. at 641; cf Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 433-34 (6th Cir. 2002)
(narrowly construing "land use regulation" in holding RLUIPA did not apply to road
development).
43 Hamilton, supra note 25; see also HAMIuTON, supra note 7, at 78-110 (cataloging the injurious effects of RLUIPA on land use regulation).
44 Hamilton, supra note 25.
45 Id.
46 See Cristina Finetti, Comment, Limiting the Scope of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act: Why RLUIPA Should Not Be Amended to Regulate Eminent
Domain Actions Against Religious Propety, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 667, 669, 691-92
(2008).
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landmarking provisions have impaired the public good, on balance.4 7
She suggests that any extension of the Act to eminent domain will
operate in similarly deleterious ways. In this Article, by contrast, we
take no position on the desirability of the Act's core applications to
zoning and landmarking, which we assume for the sake of argument
are justifiable. We argue more narrowly that, even if RLUIPA is basically defensible, significant differences between zoning and eminent
domain counsel against an expansion of the law to cover the latter.
With regard to the student note, we are not convinced that outright
takings invariably involve government in considerations that are not
individualized in the sense that they are targeted to specific parcels of
land. Our review of the cases and of anecdotal reports suggests, to the
contrary, that forced sales are indeed frequently directed toward specific religious holdings.4 8
47 See Hamilton, supra note 25 ("Before either House of Congress thinks about
amending RLUIPA [to extend its provisions to condemnation], its members might
want to hear from their constituents about the actual, on-the-ground impact of
RLUIPA['s core provisions] on residential neighborhoods . . . . There are many,
many neighborhoods in every state that are currently being negatively affected by
RLUIPA, and their residents are mad as hell.").
48 See Saxer, supra note 24, at 679 ("[E]minent domain actions will likely be subject to individualized assessments . . . ."); cf Mathues, supra note 36, at 1664 ("Eminent domain proceedings, by their nature, are not generally applicable laws because
the proceedings single out specific properties for condemnation.").
For example, the Township of Wayne in NewJersey, acting pursuant to a referendum that set aside funds to acquire and preserve open space, formed a committee to
investigate candidate properties. According to the mayor, "the Committee pursued
properties on an individualized property-by-property basis." Albanian Associated
Fund v. Twp. Of Wayne, No. 06-cv-3217, 2007 WL 2904194, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
Not incidentally, one councilman indicated that a Muslim group's application to
build a mosque on a piece of undeveloped land was one of the reasons that the open
space referendum was placed on the ballot in the first place. Id.
The parcel of land at issue in Faith Temple also appears to have been considered
singly, because it was contiguous with a park that the town wished to expand. See
Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251-52 (W.D.N.Y.
2005). If it was considered alongside other contiguous properties, that fact was not
reported in the court's decision. See id. Here too, the exercise of eminent domain
proceeded in a particularized fashion.
Similarly, Christian Romany Church Ministries, Inc. v. Broward County, 980 So. 2d
1164, 1165-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), focused on a particular piece of church

property that it felt was optimal for the expansion of a substance abuse facility. The
church's property was the only private land necessary to complete the project, which
otherwise relied on adjacent plots already owned by the government. Id. Although
the case concerned a state law cognate of RLUIPA, rather than RLUIPA itself, its facts
nevertheless demonstrate that the local exercise of eminent domain power often
works in an individualized way.
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Perhaps because of these weaknesses in currently available
defenses of the view that RLUIPA should never apply to condemnation-weaknesses that we hope to rectify here-the third, intermediate position is somewhat more prevalent.
C. An IntermediateApproach
Several recent decisions have adopted a middle solution, one that
neither insists that RLUIPA should always require heightened scrutiny
of all eminent domain actions that substantially burden religious entities, nor holds that it should never apply to condemnation, but
instead contends that it sometimes should.
Adherents of this view think that the Act's presumption of illegality should apply in at least one of two related situations. First, courts
should pay careful attention when a local government resorts to condemnation in order to circumvent the difficulties of zoning or
landmarking religious property. Governments may want to work an
end run around zoning procedures because a church can effectively
resist regulation under ordinary zoning law-for instance, by seeking
nonconforming use status or a special-use permit, for which churches
often qualify.49 Or they may resort to eminent domain because the
49 One national study found that of the many congregations that applied for a
land use permit or license in the past year, only one percent reported having been
denied. Chaves & Tsitsos, supra note 3, at 341. Ninety-two percent reported that the
permit or license had been granted, and five percent said that the process was ongoing. Id.
Those findings are consistent with results from a national study of Presbyterian
congregations. Id. ("This result-a 1 percent denial rate-is identical to that
obtained in a survey of Presbyterian congregations that is, to our knowledge, the only
other survey of this kind."); see also RESEARCH SERVS., PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.),
CONGREGATIONAL STATISTICS FOR

1997 [hereinafter

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, CONGREGA-

available at http://www.pcusa.org/research/congrestats/sasr97.
htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (reporting that of 2312 congregations that sought
TIONAL STATISTICS],

some sort of land use permit or license in the period between 1992 and 1997, only
thirty congregations, or one percent, reported that the permit was refused or that
they abandoned the project in anticipation of a denial); cf Laycock, supra note 12, at
772-73 (describing the 1997 Presbyterian study and noting that of the 2194 churches
that applied for permits over a five-year period, only twenty-eight reported denials or
expected denials).
A smaller study, confined to the city of New Haven, Connecticut, found that land
use permissions were granted to religious groups at rates that were high, as an absolute matter, and comparable to those encountered by nonreligious applicants. Stephen Clowney, Comment, An EmpiricalLook at Churches in the ZoningProcess, 116 YALE
L.J. 859, 863 (2007) (reporting that seventy-six percent of churches' applications for
exemptions from land use regulations were granted, as compared to eighty percent
for secular applicants).
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religious landowner has invoked RLUIPA's core provisions themselves
against threatened regulation.5 0 Either way, on this view, the Act
should apply to condemnation actions that are initiated so as to work
an end run around legal barriers to zoning religious property.5'
Second, the protections of the Act ought to come into play, for
adherents of this view, whenever condemnation is sufficiently intertwined with a zoning or landmarking scheme. One way of reading the
Cottonwood decision is to say that the town's decision to condemn the
congregation's property and pave the way for Costco was an integral
part of its plan to redevelop the larger area surrounding the church's
plot. Recently, a few courts have read Cottonwood to stand for this narrower proposition, rather than for the maximalist view that the Act
should always apply to condemnation of religious land. They have
then distinguished the case, concluding that, at least under the particular circumstances before them, the locality's exercise of eminent
domain was not similarly intertwined with a larger zoning plan.5 2
50 See Allison Scaduto, Comment, RLUIPA as a Possible Shield From the Government
Taking of Religious Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 823, 845-46 (2008).
51 The textual hook for this reading is contained in the definitions section of the
statute. There Congress specified that "land use regulation" means not only "a zoning
or landmarking law" but also "the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a
claimant's use or development of land." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2006). Supporters
of the intermediate approach argue that a local government's effort to circumvent
the Act's zoning provisions should count as an "application of" a zoning law that
restricts the use of land, even though the government is acting through its power of
eminent domain. See Saxer, supra note 24, at 669 ("Even if an eminent domain action
is not considered to be a zoning or landmarking law, it would likely be treated as 'the
application of such a law.'").
52 See Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256
(W.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that, under the facts, the link between condemnation and
zoning is "too attenuated to constitute the application of a zoning law" such that
RLUIPA would be triggered); St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 401 F.
Supp. 2d 887, 899-900 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that Cottonwood "can be read to suggest that RLUIPA is applicable to the specific eminent domain actions where the condemnation proceeding is intertwined with other actions by the city involving zoning
regulations," and holding that the case before it presented no allegation that Chicago's exercise of eminent domain stems from zoning regulations or a landmarking
law), affd, 502 F.3d 616, 641 (7th Cir. 2007); City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman,
129 P.3d 542, 563-64 (Haw. 2006) (reading Cottonwood narrowly and distinguishing
its facts from those before the court).
To the extent that Cottonwood stands for the broader proposition that RLUIPA
should virtually always apply to condemnation actions, either on its own terms or
because those actions are practically almost always initiated pursuant to some zoning
plan, courts have expressed disagreement. See St. John's, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900 n.7;
Faith Temple, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 256-57.
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One court, however, concluded that RLUIPA did in fact apply to
the town's exercise of eminent domain after it deployed a variation of
this intermediate approach. There, a Muslim group bought an undeveloped parcel of land in Wayne, New Jersey with the intent of building a new mosque for its growing congregation.5 3 The group
submitted a land development application, which it revised several
times over a period of years in response to requests from the town's
zoning board. Subsequently, while the application was pending, the
town formulated an open space plan that called for purchasing and
preserving undeveloped land, including the Muslim group's site.
After an initial purchase offer was rejected, the town announced a
plan to initiate condemnation proceedings and, in response, the
group filed suit. 54 The district court reasoned that the condemnation
proceeding was initiated as part of the open space plan, which
unquestionably was a "land use regulation" within the meaning of the
Act.5 5 Eminent domain was simply one means by which the town was
implementing its greater regulatory plan. Not incidentally, the court
also found that sufficient facts had been alleged to show that the
planned mosque had been targeted by the town in violation of
RLUIPA's equal treatment provisions.5 6
This intermediate approach has some intuitive appeal. At first
blush, it would seem odd to allow local governments to avoid the Act
by simply condemning property that RLUIPA would make difficult to
zone. However, this position insufficiently appreciates the political
economy dynamics that surround a local government's exercise of
eminent domain. Those dynamics suggest that the best available
rationales for RLUIPA's zoning provisions do not pertain in the same
way to condemnation. In the next Part, we briefly set out those rationales so that we then can demonstrate why the Act ought not to apply
to outright takings at all.
II.

THE POLiTICAL ECONOMY OF RLUIPA

In this Part we first reconstruct a plausible defense for RLUIPA's
core provision concerning zoning and landmarking. Briefly, we contend that the Act is best conceptualized as a prophylactic instrument
designed to guard against antireligious discrimination that would be
53 Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-cv-3217, 2007 WL 2904194,
at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
54 Id. at *4.
55 Id. at *8.
56 See id. at *13 ("In the Court's view, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the
Mosque was not being singled out for discriminatory treatment.").
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difficult to detect in local zoning and landmarking decisions. (As a
reminder, we identify this rationale for the sake of argument, without
endorsing RLUIPA as a wise or measured response to any threat of
discrimination.) Next, in Section B, we explain why differences
between the political economies of zoning and condemnation mean
that even the best available justifications for the Act's zoning provisions apply more weakly to outright takings. In Section C, we then
look at the other side of the balance sheet-not the justifications for
the statute, but its costs for local governments-and we conclude that
the costs of presumptively exempting religious actors from eminent
domain actions are likely to be far higher than the costs exacted by
the Act's existing zoning measures.
A.

Zoning and Prophylaxis

Our argument in this Section is that RLUIPA can be defended
most persuasively as a prophylactic measure that works to combat covert discrimination on the basis of religion in zoning and landmarking
regulation. Not only is this the best available justification for the statute as a conceptual matter, but it was also the principal rationale
offered by the law's sponsors in Congress.5 7
1. RLUIPA's Best Defense
Recall that RLUIPA prohibits all land use regulations that impose
a substantial burden on religious exercise, unless the government can
show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring.5 8 Although the Act
also contains sections requiring equal treatment of religious entities, 5 9
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion,6 0 and prohibiting
governments from completely excluding religious groups from ajurisdiction,'6 1 we focus here on its central provision, which again extends a
presumption of illegality to land use regulations that impose a sub57 See infra text accompanying notes 72-75.
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006).
59 Id. § 2000cc(b)(1) ("No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than
equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.").
60 Id. § 2000cc(b) (2) ("No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.").
61 Id. § 2000cc(b) (3) ("No government shall impose or implement a land use
regulation that-(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from ajurisdiction; or (B)
unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a
jurisdiction.").
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stantial burden on religious property. 62 That provision, which does
not simply mimic already existing constitutional rules, is the most
interesting for the purposes of our argument and has drawn the greatest share of attention in the literature.63
Current constitutional law does not require heightened scrutiny
of incidental burdens on free exercise, of course. A presumption of
unconstitutionality will not be triggered by a neutral law of general
applicability. 64 RLUIPA's substantial burden provision extends
greater protection as a statutory matter in the contexts of prisons and
land use, requiring a presumption of illegality whenever the government's actions incidentally thwart religious observance, not merely
when they purposefully discriminate on the basis of religion or single
out free exercise for unfavorable treatment. 65
It is possible to defend the Act as a prophylactic instrument. As
we understand the term, a prophylactic rule prohibits more govern62
63
ture.

Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
The substantial burden section has also been the focus of debate in the literaSee, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EIScRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

AND THE CONSTITUTION 268-70 (2007) (concentrating on this provision).

64 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990). There are a few
exceptions to Smith's main rule-for individualized assessments, violations of hybrid
rights, and so forth. Moreover, nonneutral government actions arguably can also trigger a presumption of unconstitutionality even in the absence of a discriminatory purpose or object. The Act's peripheral provisions mirror some of these constitutional
intricacies, which we leave to one side here. For an account of the cases leading up to
RLUIPA, and the current state of the constitutional rules, see Nelson Tebbe, Free
Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 705-11, 725-27 (2005).
65 We describe RLUIPA's relationship to the Free Exercise Clause for the sake of
clarity only. Importantly, our assessment of RLUIPA here is independent of its relationship to any constitutional protection under the First Amendment. We do not
take a position on whether existing understandings of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are defensible and we do not tie our identification of RLUIPA's
justifications to longstanding arguments surrounding those provisions. Nor do we
therefore consider whether RLUIPA falls within Congress's enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, we assess arguments for
RLUIPA's desirability as a freestanding matter. To be sure, we start with the uncontroverted proposition that governmental discrimination on the basis of religion ought
to be prohibited. Although this is a basic constitutional principle, we invoke it as a
separate norm. In sum, then, our articulation of a defense of RLUIPA as a prophylactic rule is independent of constitutional arguments.
We also note that other statutes require heightened scrutiny of laws that substantially burden religious exercise in contexts beyond land use and prisons. RFRA, for
one, still restricts federal entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a). Moreover, many states
either have enacted laws like RFRA that constrain officials in jurisdictions where they
apply, or have construed their state constitutions to extend similar protection. See,
e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofExpressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN.
L. REv. 1919, 1950 n.116 (2006) (listing these state provisions).
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ment activity than the law otherwise would in a first-best world of perfect detection and enforcement.6 6 Under perfect conditions, legal
rules would be administered in such a way that they prohibit or punish all activity that is in fact illegal and only that activity. But because
actually existing legal institutions are imperfect, that sort of precision
is often not achievable. In our second-best world, institutional limitations create risks of error in case-by-case adjudication so that courts
often operate under conditions of considerable uncertainty. Most frequently, the specific difficulty is that courts lack the factfinding capacity to accurately detect when a legal violation has actually occurred,
particularly where the scrutinized government official is acting under
subjective standards that allow a great deal of discretion and require
little reliable reporting.6 7 Pragmatic difficulties like these may lead to
the construction of legal rules that predictably err on the side of
prohibiting or punishing too much activity.6 8 Such prophylactic
mechanisms can be justified when the cost of erring on the side of
prohibiting too much government activity-the cost of overprotection-is lower than the cost of erring on the side of barring too little-the cost of underprotection. 69
66 Prophylactic rules are significant in the law. Though we are addressing statutory rules rather than judge-made ones, we draw our basic insights from the literature
on judge-made prophylactic rules-most famously, the Miranda rule. See Mitchell N.
Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 133-36 (2004); Evan H.
Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic"Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 7-28
(2001); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190
(1988).
67 See Caminker, supra note 66, at 6-12; Strauss, supra note 66, at 201-04, 208-09;
see also Mark Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65
N.D. L. REV. 161, 168 (1989) ("Both courts and commentators have recognized that
discretion is an inevitable and necessary part of zoning decisionmaking.").
68 Our definition of prophylactic rules puts to one side the debate over whether
there is a meaningful difference between the actual meaning of the Constitution and
the doctrine that courts fashion to enforce its provisions. See Berman, supra note 66,
at 14-15 (describing that conceptual issue). The outcome of that disagreement has
little bearing on the fairly clear difference here between the constitutional rule
against religious discrimination and RLUIPA's broad rule against substantial burdens
on religious observance.
69 A number of people have defended Title Vll's disparate impact provisions on
these grounds. Professor Richard Primus has usefully characterized this approach to
antidiscrimination as an "evidentiary dragnet," used "because deliberate discrimination can be difficult to prove." Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARv. L. REv. 493, 520 (2003). Primus ultimately rejects this
justification for reasons distinct to Title VII. See id. at 520-23. Prophylactic justifications for antidiscrimination law are nevertheless commonplace in the context of
antidiscrimination law, and we generally follow the same analytical approach in this
proposed justification of RLUIPA. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
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RLUIPA's substantial burden provision can be seen as just that
sort of prophylactic device. If the concern is antireligious discrimination in land use regulation, there may be good reason to worry that
courts lack the capacity to accurately detect violations on a case-bycase basis. Too often, the theory goes, zoning and landmarking
authorities are able to obscure discrimination against religious groups
by giving ostensibly neutral reasons for land use determinations that
are in fact illicit.7 0 Zoning and landmarking determinations are so
frequent, so often handed down with insufficient reasoning, and so
commonly governed by standards that leave ample room for subjectivity, that courts have a difficult time policing them for antireligious
activity.7 '
Congress relied on precisely that sort of argument when it passed
RLUIPA. The law's sponsors, Senators Hatch and Kennedy, collected
evidence that they said showed widespread discrimination against
religious entities in land use regulation. 72 Where it occurs, they said,
such discrimination is frequently unarticulated, hidden behind pur305-07 (2001) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (reviewing Title VI jurisprudence); Okruhlik v.
Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615, 626 (8th Cir. 2001) (adopting prophylactic approach to
Title VII); see also, e.g., Calvin Massey, Two Zones ofProphylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. Riv. 1, 22-23 (2007) (describing
prophylactic justifications for antidiscrimination law).
70 Courts and commentators have long recognized that zoning generally presents
a likely opportunity for discrimination. See Cordes, supra note 67, at 168 n.40 (citing
sources); see also Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851
(7th Cir. 2007) (justifying RLUIPA's "substantial burden" test as protection against
intentional discrimination); Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church v.
City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding RLUIPA "backstops the
explicit prohibition of religious discrimination . . . much as the disparate-impact theory of employment discrimination backstops the prohibition of intentional
discrimination").
71 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 12, at 776-77 (detailing evidence of discrimination and noting that "[t]hese patterns [of discrimination] appear because views about
churches distort discretionary decisions under vague and subjective standards).
There does seem to be evidence that land use decisions concerning religious
congregations are often based on the specifics of the individual case. See PRESBYtERIAN CHURCH, CONGREGATIONAL STATISTICS, supra note 49, at 4 (reporting that of the

thousands of congregations that sought land use permits over a five-year period,
thirty-two percent said that "no clear rules permitted or forbade what we wanted to
do, and everything was decided based on the specifics of this particular case" and
adding that sixteen percent more reported that "even though a clear rule seemed to
permit or forbid what we wanted to do, the land use authority's principal decision
involved granting exceptions to the rule based on the specifics of this particular
case").
72 See 146 CONG. REc. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) ("Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular,
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portedly neutral justifications such as concerns about traffic or aesthetics. 7 3 The sponsors explicitly recognized the difficulty of
fashioning a rule that would accurately target local governments that
engaged in discriminatory land use regulation. 74 That is, Congress
perceived a need for a prophylactic rule that would be designed to
address the institutional concern that courts would not effectively
unearth antireligious discrimination. So it crafted a broad substantial
burden provision, knowing that the law might sweep in local land use
activity that was not in fact discriminatory. 75
Leading commentators on both sides-supporters and detractors
alike-have identified something like our prophylactic justification as
the best defense of RLUIPA's central provision. Professor Laycock,
who testified repeatedly before Congress in favor of religious freedom
legislation, has argued that zoning decisions often involve individualized determinations that are arrived at under discretionary or subjective standards and that provide fertile ground for antireligious
discrimination. 76 "Consciously or unconsciously, land use authorities
discriminate against religion and among religions," he wrote in an
article that was later relied on by the Act's sponsors and that overlaps
with much of his congressional testimony.7 7 The difficulty he identiare frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the
highly individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.").
73 Id. ("Sometimes, zoning board members or neighborhood residents explicitly
offer race or religion as the reason to exclude a proposed church, especially in cases
of black churches and Jewish shuls and synagogues. More often, discrimination lurks
behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as traffic, aesthetics, or 'not
consistent with the city's land use plan."'); id. at 16,699 ("Where it occurs, [discrimination against religious land uses] is often covert.").
74 Id. at 16,699 ("It is impossible to make separate findings about every jurisdiction, or to legislate in a way that reaches only those jurisdictions that are guilty.").
75 We take no position on the constitutional question of whether Congress had
authority to pass RLUIPA's substantial burden provision under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, Congress has not straightforwardly relied on that authority-instead, it mainly grounded the substantial burden provision on other
enumerated powers, namely those granted in the Commerce and Spending Clauses.
See id. ("The General Rules in §2(a) (1), requiring that substantial burdens on religious exercise be justified by a compelling interest, applies only to cases within the
spending power or the commerce power, or to cases where government has authority
to make individualized assessments of the proposed uses to which the property will be
put."). Rather, we are assessing available justifications for the Act's central provision
more generally, putting to one side questions concerning its constitutionality.
76 See Laycock, supra note 12, at 776 ("The hostile attitudes [of land use regulators toward religion] are real, not theoretical, and individualized processes under
vague standards give such attitudes ample opportunity for expression.").
77 Id. at 777, cited in 146 CONG. REc. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens.
Hatch & Kennedy). Compare Laycock, supra note 12, at 777 (discussing the preva-
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fied is that purposive discrimination and unequal treatment are
extraordinarily difficult to prove in land use cases, because bias
against religious land uses can always be attributed to inevitable differences between factual scenarios. Consequently, government action
can easily be justified by reference to neutral reasons.7 8
RLUIPA's substantial burden provision addresses this problem by
eliminating the need to prove discrimination.79 Once a congregation
has shown that its religious exercise has been substantially burdened
by a land use regulation, the burden shifts to the government and if
the court is not convinced, the group may prevail without ever having
to prove that its religious exercise was thwarted because of discrimination.80 In testimony before Congress, Laycock even described a precursor to RLUIPA as a "prophylactic rule[ ] for land use regulation."8 1
A prophylactic rule is needed, according to his reasoning, because
lence of unreported church land use conflicts), with The Religious Liberty ProtectionAct
of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 223 (1998) (statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of Texas Law School) (suggesting that there can be a reasonable inference of
unreported discrimination drawn from reported cases of discrimination).
78 See Laycock, supra note 12, at 781-83. Of course, this reasoning applies to all
forms of discriminatory zoning. Nevertheless, Congress chose to confine its concern
in RLUIPA to religious discrimination.
79 See id. at 783-84 (discussing state RFRAs in terms that are equally applicable to
a federal statute). Again, this article is similar to testimony that Laycock presented to
Congress. See supra note 77; infra note 81.
80 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (1) (2006).
81 The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1691 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 109 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1691] (statement of Douglas Laycock, Associate Dean for
Research, University of Texas Law School). Laycock also testified that "in cases in
which religious exercise is burdened .. . , many of the laws affected will be unconstitutional," a statement that implicitly recognized that the law would be overprotective.
Id.
Laycock was speaking about § 3(b) of The Religious Liberty Protection Act of
1999, a prototype for what would become RLUIPA's substantial burden provision. It
provided:
Where, in applying or implementing any land use regulation or exemption,
or system of land use regulations or exemptions, a government has the
authority to make individualized assessments of the proposed uses to which
real property would be put, the government may not impose a substantial
burden on a person's religious exercise, unless the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (A) (1999).
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"discrimination [against religious land uses is] extremely difficult to
prove in any individual case."8 2
Opponents of RLUIPA likewise have identified prophylaxis
against covert discrimination as the statute's most persuasive rationale. Professors Eisgruber and Sager, for instance, agree that
RLUIPA's sponsors in the Senate relied chiefly on the idea that the
law was necessary to remedy discrimination that would be hard to
prove in court and might well go unaddressed absent legislative
action.8 3 Eisgruber and Sager even acknowledge that if religious entities did in fact face widespread, undetected discrimination in land
use, the Act would be justifiable for precisely the reasons that Congress gave-because under those conditions the likelihood of overenforcement created by the Act would be necessary to counteract the
even greater risk of underenforcement that would otherwise exist.84
What bothers Eisgruber and Sager is that the law is much too far
reaching, even considering the institutional limitations that may result
in predictable adjudicative error. Chiefly, they come to that conclusion because they think that the empirical evidence of bias against
religious land uses is fairly weak.8 5 Given that reliable studies have
82 Hearings, supra note 81.
83 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 63, at 269.
84 See id.; see also id. at 252-57 (describing congressional remedies for underenforcement generally); Lawrence G. Sager, Panel One Commentary, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SuRv. AM. L. 9, 14 (2000) (noting that supporters "defend RLUIPA as a prophylaxis
against discrimination by municipalities against disfavored churches" and granting
that that argument "represents a distinct conceptual advance").
85 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supranote 63, at 270-72; see also HAMILTON, supra note
7, at 87 ("The problem with the discrimination claims was that there are virtually no
cases to support [religious entities'] argument that Congress needed to intervene to
help these landowners.").
For nonanecdotal empirical evidence, Congress relied primarily on a study conducted by a law professor at Brigham Young University, in conjunction with lawyers at
a firm in Chicago. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18 & n.70 (citing Laycock as providing an accurate summary of the study evidence at several congressional hearings);
Von G. Keetch & Matthew K. Richards, The Need for Legislation to Enshrine FreeExercise
in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 725, 729-71 (1999) (reporting results of
the BYU study); Laycock, supra note 12, at 770-71 (summarizing the evidence considered by Congress, including principally the BYU study). However, that study has been
criticized persuasively for relying exclusively on reported judicial decisions. See ElsGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 63, at 271; Clowney, supranote 49, at 865 & n.29 (citing
criticisms of the BYU study).
Apparently, the only other piece of nonanecdotal evidence that Congress might
have relied on was an internal study conducted by one mainline denomination, the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). See Laycock, supra note 12, at 772 (indicating that the
Presbyterian study was before Congress). That study found that only one percent of
congregations that sought land use permits or licenses reported that their requests
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shown little or no disproportionate constraint on land use by American congregations, RLUIPA's substantial burden rule, which creates a
presumption of illegality around a spectrum of land use regulations in
many different factual settings, sweeps far too broadly for the taste of
these critics.
Setting aside that critique of RLUIPA, powerful as it is, our objective here is simply to point out that the Act can, with the least amount
of controversy, be justified as a prophylaxis against difficult-to-detect
discrimination on the basis of religion in land use regulation.
2.

A Broader Defense

Some might defend RLUIPA on broader grounds, namely that
religious entities ought to enjoy strong protection not because they
might otherwise be vulnerable to undetected discrimination, but
because they ought to enjoy a presumptive exemption from all land
use regulations that substantially interfere with observance, even if
those rules are neutral and generally applicable. On this view, in
other words, religious actors have a liberty right to engage in religiously mandated land uses free of all but the most necessary government interference, here in the form of essential zoning and
landmarking restrictions. For proponents of this justification, the statute's substantial burden provision is not a prophylactic rule; instead, it
provides exactly the right level of protection against local government
were denied or were expected to be denied. PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, CONGREGATIONAL
STATIsTICs, supra note 49, at 3. Laycock points out that about twenty-eight congregations confronted actual or expected denials, but that number is relatively insignificant
compared to the thousands of applications submitted by churches over the five-year
period covered by the study. Compare Laycock, supra note 12, at 772-73 (making this
argument), with PRESBYIERIAN CHURCH, CONGREGATIONAL STATISTIcs, supra note 49, at
3 (putting the number of actual or expected denials at thirty).
Discrimination is notoriously difficult to uncover, but reports based on more
comprehensive data sets have found little evidence of widespread land use discrimination, either against religious groups generally or among such groups. See Chaves &
Tsitsos, supra note 3, at 341 (reporting on a representative national sample and concluding that "[t]he nearly universal experience of American congregations seeking
government authorization to do something they want to do is one of facilitation
rather than roadblock"); Clowney, supra note 49, at 860 (reporting on a study of
records of zoning exemption applications in one city and concluding that "New
Haven religious institutions, both large and small, face little discernable discrimination from municipal land use regulations"). Reportedly, the Chaves and Tsitsos study
was available to Congress, but was ignored. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 63, at
271; Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and InstitutionalizedPersons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 352 (2003).
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regulations that have the incidental effect of burdening religious
activity.
Proponents of this broader understanding see RLUIPA as part of
Congress's ongoing effort to combat the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,86 which they feel wrongly weakened protection
of religious liberty by removing meaningful judicial review of laws and
policies that incidentally burden religious observance, leaving in place
heightened scrutiny for only a few narrow categories of cases. For
them, RLUIPA, like its predecessor RFRA, seeks to reverse the legal
effect of that decision by restoring the pre-Smith level of protection, if
only as a statutory matter and if only in the limited contexts of land
use and institutionalized persons.8 7 Put differently, people who view
RLUIPA this way think it is properly designed to protect religious
exercise against laws and policies that have the incidental effect of
burdening sacred practices.
Admittedly, the legislative history indicates that RLUIPA was
sometimes conceptualized in this way.8 8 And Eisgruber and Sager say
they have trouble believing that RLUIPA's sweeping substantial burden provision was in fact designed to combat discrimination alone.8 9
Unmistakably, they are suggesting that the law was actually crafted to
give religious entities protection against burdensome land use regula86 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
87 Congress designed RFRA specifically to combat Smith and to restore the level
of religious freedom protection that religious actors had enjoyed prior to that case.
In RFRA's preamble, Congress found that Smith "virtually eliminated the requirement
that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral
toward religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (2006). The preamble went on to
explain that Congress aimed "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),"
cases that had governed free exercise claims prior to Smith, "and to guarantee [that
test's] application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
88 See, e.g., 146 CONG. REc. 14,283 (2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Under
current law, an assembly whose religious practice is burdened by an otherwise 'generally applicable' and 'neutral' law can obtain relief only by carrying the heavy burden
of proving that there is an unconstitutional motivation behind a law, and thus, that it
is not truly neutral or generally applicable. Such a standard places a seemingly insurmountable barrier between the religious assemblies of our country and their right to
worship freely.").
89 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 63, at 272; see also Sager, supra note 84, at 15
("RLUIPA is best understood as aimed not at the protection of churches against discrimination but rather at a very different target. The proponents of RFRA have been
relentless in their effort to gain back some of the ground lost when the Supreme
Court invalidated that measure. Land use offered a domain where the reinstitution of
RFRA was politically acceptable.").
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tion. Leading academic proponents of RLUIPA have also indicated,
on occasion, that the law deserves support simply because it eases governmental restrictions on the ability of churches to pursue their callings through land development.9 0
To the extent that this broader rationale has figured into support
for the Act, we do not find it persuasive. There is little reason to think
that all religious landowners-irrespective of wealth or political influence-deserve the strongest possible constitutional protection against
a wide range of zoning and landmarking regulations.9 1 While religious liberty certainly is often exercised through land use by churches,
mosques, and synagogues, interference with that sort of sacred use
should nevertheless be subject to some lower level ofjudicial scrutiny,
absent discrimination or an unacceptably high risk of discrimination
that otherwise may go undetected.9 2
Our opposition draws on the experience of the Court during the
nearly thirty years before Smith, when the Court ostensibly was applying the compelling interest test to all laws and policies that burdened
observance-and not merely as a way of preemptively guarding
against discrimination, but also in order to ensure that religious
groups could observe their convictions despite all but the most pressing general laws. Over time, it became clear that the Justices in fact
were turning away free exercise claims more frequently and easily

90 Laycock, for instance, has suggested that the law can be justified not only as a
prophylaxis against discrimination, but also as a shield against burdensome regulation. Laycock, supra note 12, at 783 ("Part of the problem is discrimination against
churches and among churches; part of the problem [faced by churches in the land
use context] is highly intrusive and burdensome regulation, imposed for modest public purposes and without regard to the effect on constitutional rights.").
91 In fact, there is reason to be concerned about the extent of some religious
groups' influence over local land use decisions, at least in certain situations. See Garnett, supra note 18, at 118-30 (describing the role of Catholic churches in siting highways in Detroit so as to preserve parish boundaries).
92 One of us has argued for an understanding of the Free Exercise Clause that
includes heightened protection for religious liberty, independent of any concern for
discrimination. See Tebbe, supra note 64, at 703-04. However, that proposal also
opposes protecting free exercise with the sort of strict scrutiny rule set out in
RLUIPA-precisely because of the difficulties that strict scrutiny presents when
applied across the full range of legal contexts, including land use regulation. See id. at
730-32. And again, even if the Sherbert-eraCourt in fact enforced something closer to
intermediate scrutiny while articulating a compelling interest test, there is a meaningful difference between the two tests in the RLUIPA context, given the administrability
concern that we express below, namely that lower courts may enforce the act's compelling interest test as written. See infra note 96 (making a similar point).
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than one would have expected under that rigorous standard.9 3 Even
some defenders of robust protection for religious liberty came to realize that many of these cases were rightly decided and, consequently,
that applying the strongest available presumption of unconstitutionality might not be appropriate for every law that happened to impinge
on the rituals or beliefs of one or another faith community. 94 Sacred
practices ran up against such a variety of government activities that
exempting them from nearly all such laws would not have matched
common conceptions of the proper scope of religious freedom. In
other words, the compelling interest test did not seem to fit the most
attractive understandings of the Free Exercise Clause.9 5 Prominent
supporters of religious exemptions such as Michael McConnell therefore began to distance themselves from that test (or at least from the
rigorous application of that test familiar from other areas of constitutional law), even while they took the Court to task for shedding all
meaningful review of incidental burdens on free exercise in Smith.9 6
93 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (noting that the
Court's results had not conformed to what one would have expected under strict
scrutiny even where it had "purported to apply the Sherbert test"); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the strict scrutiny
standard does not explain the Court's holdings particularly well and citing examples);
see also Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious
Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARv. L. REV. 155, 201 (2004)
(discussing the era before Smith and noting that "many commentators thought the
compelling interest test was relaxed in some of the cases that the government won");
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1127-28 (1990) (concluding that "the Supreme Court before Smith did not
really apply a genuine 'compelling interest' test"); Tebbe, supra note 64, at 730-31
(noting the Court's increasing use of "balancing tests that fall somewhere between
compelling interest and rational basis").
94 See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE
AND FAIRNESS 214-15 (2006) (pointing out that the Court's application of the compelling interest test in the religion context has not been, and should not be, as demanding as in other contexts); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 182-85, 222-23 (1995) (arguing for a construction of RFRA that mimics the Court's weaker application of the
strict scrutiny test before Smith was decided).
95 Principally, strict scrutiny seemed unnecessary to protect either religious liberty or government neutrality toward religion. A detailed discussion of these concepts
lies beyond the scope of this Article but can be found in Tebbe, supra note 64, at
705-11, 725-27.
96 McConnell, supra note 93, at 1127 ("Even the Justices committed to the doctrine of free exercise exemptions [from neutral laws] have in fact applied a far more
relaxed standard [than strict scrutiny] to these cases, and they were correct to do so.
The 'compelling interest' standard is a misnomer.").
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With respect to the particular context of land use regulation, it is
likewise difficult to believe that a standard requiring maximal judicial
skepticism would generate results that would line up with an appealing account of what religious observers actually ought to be able to do
without government interference. The contexts and circumstances in
which religious landowners face obstacles are too complex and wide
ranging to warrant a strong blanket presumption against all government regulation.9 7 If RLUIPA's deployment of constitutional law's
most powerful standard is to be defended, it cannot be on the ground
that religious observers deserve a broad right to practice their faiths
free of all laws that burden those practices only incidentally.
Whether for the reasons we have just given or others, most supporters of RLUIPA seem not to have put forward this broader rationale. Consequently, it has played a secondary role in the public
debate, even among the statute's defenders.9 8 The more prominent
justification for the statute has instead been the narrower one that we
have identified, namely that heightened scrutiny is necessary to block
Some may object to our analysis by saying that the Court actually applied something less than full compelling-interest review during the Sherbert era-something
closer to intermediate scrutiny-and that RLUIPA requires only that lesser level of
scrutiny, and thus the costs of applying the statute to condemnation would be less
serious than we fear. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 94, at 200-45 (setting out a
similar reading of the case law); see also infra Part II.C (describing the costs of applying RLUIPA to condemnation actions). Our response is that even if the Supreme
Court is sensitive enough to its own history to interpret the compelling interest standard in RLUIPA in light of this understanding of its own precedents, lower courts
cannot be counted on to do so, and may instead apply traditional strict scrutiny. If
nothing else, then, concerns of administrability justify our assessment of the costs of
extending the statute to cover outright takings. Also, for those who support Smith,
even intermediate scrutiny would result in invalidation of too many land use
regulations.
97 We leave to one side here the more general question of whether the constitutional guarantee of free exercise ever ought to include protection of liberty or autonomy, independent of concerns about discrimination; our point here is simply that any
such conception cannot justify the application of strict scrutiny.
98 Laycock, for instance, has referred to the broader rationale only in passing,
focusing instead on the need for protection against antireligious bias. Compare, e.g.,
Laycock, supra note 12, at 774-77, 781-83 (setting out in some detail the argument
that hostility toward minority sects is widespread among government officials who
exercise discretionary authority over land use, and that those officials will often disguise that hostility by giving neutral justifications for their decisions, justifications that
will be difficult to disprove in litigation), with id. at 783 (noting in passing that "part
of the problem," in addition to undetectable discrimination, is "highly intrusive and
burdensome regulation, imposed for modest public purposes and without regard to
the effect on constitutional rights").
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discrimination by local land use authorities that otherwise might go
undetected and unaddressed.99
One feature of our prophylactic approach to RLUIPA should be
reiterated, namely its implicit reliance on a certain conception of institutional competence. According to this understanding, courts are
often unable to uncover discrimination that may be perpetrated in
individualized governmental determinations guided only by broad
standards that leave ample leeway for official subjectivity and discretion. That institutional disability is particularly regrettable because it
is precisely in these situations that judicial oversight is most needed.
Where decisionmaking is subjective and accountability is weak, the
government's own procedures provide scant opportunity for religious
minorities to protect themselves through the political process itself.
Zoning and landmarking determinations therefore present just the
sort of opportunity for covert bias that calls for judicial oversight, and
yet their particular characteristics make them particularly difficult for
courts to monitor.1 0 0 A prophylactic rule allows religious groups that
are at risk of being disfavored in such determinations to obtain relief
without having to prove actual discrimination in a forum whose institutional characteristics make that sort of showing difficult, even where
unequal treatment has actually occurred.
That institutional competence story plays out differently if we
adjust our assumptions about the visibility of governmental decisionmaking. In the next section, we explore how it unfolds not with
99 It is possible to imagine a justification for RLUIPA that falls between the narrow prophylactic rationale we have identified and the broad concern for religious
autonomy. What if officials decided to condemn a religious property not out of subjective animus toward the affected group but instead because they realized, in an
objective way, that a certain degree of discrimination against that identity group was
valued by the broader real estate market? Policymakers might not harbor any antipathy at all toward the congregation. Rather, they might simply seek to increase property values in the jurisdiction by eliminating the group, just as they might attract
homebuyers by condemning a blighted building or forcing the sale of a polluting
business. Conceivably some lawmakers supported RLUIPA in order to protect religious assemblies from just this sort of land use regulation. And that sort ofjustification
could apply with equal force to eminent domain, thereby justifying the Act's extension beyond zoning and landmarking. Yet our sense is that to the degree that this
practice can be considered discriminatory, the heightened political salience of condemnation will do much to prevent its worst instances.
100 This kind of concern about local zoning decisions, and particularly variances,
has a long pedigree. For a review of criticisms of variance procedures, see Owens,
supra note 13, at 297-99. Colorfully, one commentator in the 1950s called variance
procedures "frequently a cross between a Jacobin assize and a New England witch
trial." Richard F. Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U.
CHI. L. REv. 509, 522 n.48 (1959).
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respect to zoning, RLUIPA's central concern, but instead in the context of condemnation, with its markedly different political dynamics.
B.

The PoliticalEconomy of Condemnation

The political economy of condemnation is importantly different
and simply does not provide the same opportunity for abuse. At the
most superficial level, condemnation is less likely to be a source of
discrimination against religious groups because it appears to be less
common than zoning and other regulatory land use controls.1 0 More
profoundly, too, the expense, political salience, and visibility of condemnation will reduce the need for prophylaxis against religious discrimination in ways that are different from the politics of zoning.
Government condemnation power is very broad.102 The federal
constitutional limits are twofold and include, first, that the condemnation be for public use and, second, that compensation be paid.10 3
Courts, including state courts, have traditionally deferred to public
use determinations.1 04 Faced with few judicial limits, the principal
constraint on eminent domain is, and has always been, political.105 As
101 Good data is hard to find. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 12-13. Of
course, many instances of eminent domain provide virtually no opportunity for discrimination of any kind, as when a state department of transportation condemns
property to widen a road or otherwise develop infrastructure. Condemnation for economic development may be the context in which government flexibility leaves the
greatest possibility of discrimination, and that use of eminent domain remains quite
rare.
According to the Pacific Legal Foundation, which tracks government use of eminent domain, the total number of condemnations for private use, in all states, in a
five-year period between 1998 and 2002 was approximately 10,000. See DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATEs 2 (2006), available at http://castlecoalition.org/
pdf/publications/floodgates-report-low.pdf. Although this number may seem high, it
is actually surprisingly small, especially when compared with the local exercise of zoning power which is ubiquitous nationwide. Of course, these statistics say nothing
about the relative percentages of zoning and condemnation actions that may be motivated by discrimination.
102 This has changed somewhat in recent years, with many states enacting statutes
in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo. See Donald E. Sanders & Patricia
Pattison, The Aftermath of Kelo, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 157, 164-70 (2005).
103 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 495-96 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)).
104 Id. at 480, 482-83 (describing traditional deference to legislative determinations of public use). But see County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 783-87
(Mich. 2004) (establishing more searching public use review), rev'g Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458-59 (Mich. 1981); Merrill, supra
note 18, at 93-109 (collecting cases in which state courts found no public use).
105 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 73-75; Garnett, supra note 18, at 115-19
(discussing Chicago's condemnation of property implicating Catholic parishes).

32

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

85:1

it turns out, this is no thin bulwark. Politics is a potent defense against
abusive condemnation.
First, and probably most importantly, the fact of compensation
changes the opportunity for religious discrimination simply by making
it more expensive than zoning, which is usually free.10 6 To the extent
governments are motivated by fiscal constraints-and some undoubtedly are' 0 7-the cost of compensation will deter local officials from
pursuing discriminatory policies through eminent domain. 0 8 Importantly, just compensation imposes more than a trivial expense, usually
valued by the property's fair market value, and sometimes by even
more.10 9
Added to the compensation itself, the process required to condemn property is sufficiently expensive that it is generally a tool of last
resort for governments instead of the first one called upon. 0 Profes106 One court has adopted this reasoning in excluding condemnation from
RLUIPA. See Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255
(W.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[W]hile zoning laws are relatively 'painless' for municipalities to
enact, property taken by condemnation literally comes at a price: the fair market
value of the property, which must be paid out of the public fisc. ... [B]oth the builtin disincentive of having to pay fair market value, as well as the hurdle of having to
demonstrate a legitimate public use, mean that town officials harboring some discriminatory animus against a religious group would not generally be expected to use eminent domain as a tool to prevent the group from erecting a church within the
town.").
107 One of us has argued that small local governments are particularly responsive
to on-budget items. See Serkin, supra note 11, at 1673-74, 1680-85.
108 See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 392 (1977) ("Local officials who desire reelection will normally
refuse to pay to stop development if they can stop it without expending tax revenues
...
."); cf FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 74 ("Having to pay compensation and enduring
the transaction costs that eminent domain entails are sufficient to deter legislatures
from using eminent domain to accomplish unprincipled redistributions of wealth. To
put it cynically, there are so many cheaper ways to accomplish unprincipled redistribution that there is little reason for judges to worry about this particular issue.");
Michael A. Heller &James E. Krier, Deterrenceand Distributionin the Law of Takings, 112
HARv. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999) ("[T]he obligation to pay compensation can constrain
governmental inclinations to exploit politically vulnerable groups and individuals.").
109 For a discussion of valuation issues surrounding religious property, see infra
text accompanying notes 192-95.
Note that even if the government could reconvey the property, thereby recovering some of its purchase price, it would still have to shoulder the cost of any diminution in value due to the zoning, an amount that can be substantial. For further
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 181-82.
110 See Merrill, supra note 18, at 77-78 (describing costs of eminent domain); id. at
80 (noting that casual observation suggests that "the government views eminent
domain as a cumbersome and expensive process to be avoided if at all possible"); see
also FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 74 ("U]udicial inquiry into public use should continue
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sor Merrill has referred to this as the "'due process' costs of eminent
domain," and it includes "drafting and filing the complaint, serving
process, securing a formal appraisal, the possibility of a trial and
appeal, and so forth.""' State statutes may require localities to reimburse condemnees for attorneys' fees and expert witness costs in some
situations.1 12 Administrative expenses like these, when combined with
the burden of compensation itself, deter condemnation generally,
and make discrimination through condemnation expensive and
therefore less likely.1 13
Some indirect evidence of compensation's deterrent effect can be
found in the current debate over the Takings Clause. Both sides of
that controversy share a deeply held view that forcing governments to
pay to regulate will decrease the amount of government regulation,
perhaps dramatically.1 14 This intuition has been borne out in Oregon, where voters adopted Measure 37, essentially a statutory
super-Takings Clause requiring governments to compensate for land
use regulations having any negative impact on property values.' 15 The
stark but predictable result has been that local governments there
have almost always chosen not to enforce their land use regulations
instead of paying compensation. 16 Although the mechanism for
translating fiscal costs into government inaction is not always clear
and may vary by jurisdiction, it is hard to dispute the general effect of
a compensation requirement: it tends to restrain government action,
to be permissive"); William A. Fischel, The PoliticalEconomy of Public Use in Poletown:
How Federal Grants EncourageExcessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv.
929, 934 ("Eminent domain is an expensive way to acquire property.").
Also, governments may end up settling out of court for more than the fair market
value of the property because some state laws will penalize governments for failed
negotiations by making them pay the condemnees' attorneys fees if the amount of the
final judgment exceeds the government's final offer during settlement negotiations.
See Garnett, supra note 18, at 129-30.
111 Merrill, supra note 18, at 77.
112 Garnett, supra note 18, at 129-30.
113 FISCHEL, supranote 18, at 96. For a useful summary of the procedural requirements for condemnation in all fifty states, see PATRICKJ. ROHAN, CONDEMNATION PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 13-G2A (2008).
114 See Serkin, supra note 11, at 1633 (identifying shared assumption that "the
more the government has to pay for its actions, the less willing it will be to act"); see
also FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 96-97 (citing studies showing that administrative costs,
including relocation assistance, had a deterrent effect on condemnation).
115 OR. REv. STAT. § 197.305 (2007). For a discussion of Measure 37, see Sara C.
Galvan, Gone Too Far: Oregon's Measure 37 and the Perils of Over-Regulating Land Use, 23
YALE L. & POL'v REv. 587, 587-88 (2005).
116 Keith Aoki, All The King's Horses and All the King's Men: Hurdles to Putting the
Fragmented Metropolis Back Together Again?, 21 J.L. & POL'Y 397, 436 (2005).
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for better or worse.' 17 That may not necessarily mean that discrimination will comprise a lower proportion of land use regulation that takes
the form of condemnation rather than zoning, but it will predictably
mean that condemnation is responsible for less discriminatory governmental action overall-an absolute difference that matters when considering whether the costs of underprotection justify a prophylactic
measure such as RLUIPA's substantial burden provision.
At least as important as the financial costs of condemnation are
its political costs. Generally, the political liabilities associated with
eminent domain will be greater than those associated with regulatory
land use controls because of condemnation's heightened political salience. Especially after Kelo, but traditionally as well, government exercise of its power of eminent domain is prone to raise public hackles.
According to longstanding tradition, outright takings present a political issue of constitutional magnitude, something that is only recently
true of land use regulations. 18
More generally, the politics of condemnation implicate different
pressures and concerns than the politics of zoning. Of course, the
actual political economy of any particular eminent domain proceeding is likely to be highly context dependent. It may matter, for example, whether the government is a small town, characterized by
majoritarian politics and particularly sensitive to financial costs, or
whether it is a larger government, more susceptible to special interest
117 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 345-48 (2000) (noting that governments
are generally responsive to political costs, not fiscal ones, and that while there is an
association between the two, the mechanism that translates the latter into the former
is complex and variable).
118 Although this history is increasingly disputed, good evidence shows that the
Takings Clause was drafted to be predominantly if not exclusively concerned with
outright expropriations by the government. See William M. Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. Rrv. 782,
792-97 (1995). But see generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, "No Taking Without A Touching?"
Questions From an Armchair Originalist,45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 761 (2008) (arguing that
history of the Takings Clause is uncertain). It is indisputably true that the law of
regulatory takings is of very recent vintage. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The PolicePower
Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings "Muddle",90 MINN. L. REV.
826, 838-51 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 US. 104 (1978), was the first time the Supreme
Court incorporated the Takings Clause against the states). Of course, land use regulations as we know them now are also a relatively recent invention, dating back only to
the 1920s and the promulgation of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act. See Stuart
Meck, The Legislative Requirement that Zoning and Land Use ControlsBe Consistent with an
Independently Adopted Local Comprehensive Plan:A Model Statute, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
295, 296-97 (2000).
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group pressure." 9 If the former, the fact of compensation alone may
be enough to prevent any small subset of the community-say, immediate neighbors of some religious property-from lobbying successfully for discriminatory condemnation. The costs, borne by all local
property owners through increased property taxes, will simply be too
high. 120 Homeowners will be especially motivated to scrutinize carefully the proposed outlays and they will be unwilling to fund condemnations for discriminatory purposes that they do not value.
This story is admittedly different if the discrimination is more
widespread, as when an entire community objects to the presence of
some disfavored religious minority. Imagine, for example, in today's
political climate, a small town banding together to try to force a
mosque and its religious community to leave.12 1 A majority of taxpayers in such a community may be perfectly willing to shoulder the
increased tax burden caused by discriminatory condemnation. A
majority may be willing, in short, to pay to discriminate if their hostility to the religion or the religious group causes a greater decrease in
their collective utility than the costs of condemnation.1 22
In this situation, compensation will force local taxpayers to internalize the costs of their discrimination, but this may be small comfort
to the religious group whose property is nevertheless condemned. 123
It is important to remember, though, that the story does not end
there. Whether RLUIPA applies to condemnation or not, the First
Amendment still prevents dejure discrimination on the basis of religion. 124 While it may be easy enough for small-scale property disputes
between a religious group and its neighbors to be cloaked in religion119 See Serkin, supra note 11, at 1661-65 (comparing large and small local
governments).
120 See id. at 1652-55 (discussing the role of property taxes in funding local
services).
121 Cf Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-cv-3217, 2007 WL
2904194, at *14 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007) (denying summary judgment where local government condemned property to be developed as mosque).
122 Nor does everyone have to share discriminatory animus for this dynamic to
exist. If the religious group is disfavored enough, its presence in a community may
well depress market values generally. People voting only with their wallets may nevertheless vote to discriminate. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in
Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 451-52 (2006); see also Serkin, supra note
11, at 1658 (questioning the impact of discrimination on property values).
123 Professor Robert Ellickson has argued that property rule protection combined
with damages is appropriate as a remedy for discrimination against "racial and ideological minorities." Ellickson, supra note 108, at 417-18.
124 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993).
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neutral terms, the kind of community-wide discrimination to a religious group described here-the kind of widespread bigotry necessary
for a majority of the community to be willing to pay to condemn the
property-is likely to be easier for courts to detect.
All of this becomes somewhat more complex in larger local governments where the political process is more susceptible to special
interest group pressure, what some people describe as minoritarianism as opposed to the majoritarianism characterizing many small local
governments.12 5 Instead of motivated homeowners monitoring government actors for regulatory excess, larger municipalities sometimes
include relatively disengaged taxpayers and highly motivated special
interest groups. 2 6 There, if neighbors and opponents of a religious
group solicit the government to condemn the group's property, the
impact on property taxes may be vanishingly small for individual taxpayers and voters throughout the municipality. 1 2 7 The immediate
political cost of having to compensate for condemnation is correspondingly smaller, too, opening the door to discrimination.12 8
How a religious group will fare in the rough and tumble of interest group politics is highly dependent on local context. Larger municipalities are often staffed by professionals and contain layers of
bureaucracy that help to insulate those with condemnation authority
from the political pressure of a religious group's neighbors. 129 Where
125 See NEIL KOMESAR, LAW's LIMITs 7 (2001) (describing minoritarianism); Serkin,
supra note 11, at 1638 & n.53 (same).
126 See KOMESAR, supra note 125, at 61; Serkin, supra note 11, at 1661-62.
127 The sensitivity of budget outlays is spread over all taxpayers, allowing motivated
special interest groups, in effect, to externalize the costs of their agendas to taxpayers
more generally. See Serkin, supra note 11, at 1668 ("The greater the number of taxpayers, the smaller the per-taxpayer stake in any government action."). In this context, it amounts to spreading the costs of discrimination to taxpayers who themselves
may not have any discriminatory motivation, but who may nevertheless be relatively
indifferent if the cost is sufficiently low.
128 Of course this will be less true if the affected faith is observed by a large portion of the community. If the group is politically powerful enough, it may be able to
protect itself against condemnation in both small and large government settings. See
Garnett, supra note 18, at 115-16. Here we are considering the most difficult case for
our argument, where the affected group is a religious minority with relatively little
political power.
129 New York City, sui generis in many ways, offers an extreme example. In New
York, all condemnations are subject to the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
(ULURP), which imposes substantial procedural requirements, including layers of
approval at the community and city level. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 2-01(k) (2004).
For an overview of the ULURP process, see New York City Department of City Planning, Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
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that is not true, overprotection of religious land uses may be a bigger
problem than underprotection. In one of the most insightful treatments of condemnation of religious property, Professor Garnett
examined the politics around the siting of expressways in Chicago in
the 1950s.o3 0 In her account, various Catholics and Catholic groups
exercised considerable influence over the location of the expressways,
an influence they used to preserve Catholic parishes and, apparently,
to reinforce racial segregation. 3 1
When a larger government does wish, for whatever reason, to discriminate against a religious group, condemnation is too politically
fraught to be a likely tool. There is simply no such thing as routine
condemnation. Even where a government is condemning property
for some core public use, like building a new road, it still requires an
affirmative exercise of government power to forcibly acquire property
in an inherently nonconsensual transaction. 13 2 By contrast, the kinds
of zoning actions that are most likely to implicate religious discrimination involve denials of variances, denials of rezoning requests, or denials of conditional use permits or other permits.' 3 3 Religious groups in
these settings can be cast as supplicants to local governments, seeking
some preferential treatment over and above what the status quo
appears to permit.134 Whether this is true, and regardless of whether
a local government routinely grants similar variances to secular orga130 See Garnett, supra note 18, at 110-19.
131 Id. at 112-13.
132 As Merrill explains: "First, and most important, legislatures must authorize the
exercise of eminent domain. It is thus necessary to persuade a legislature to grant the
power of eminent domain, or, if a general grant of the power already exists, to persuade officials to exercise it." Merrill, supra note 18, at 77 (footnote omitted); see also,
e.g., Goldman v. Moore, 220 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ill. 1966) (discussing the board of education's failure to authorize condemnation by an appropriate resolution).
133 See League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. Los Angeles, 498 F.3d
1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (denying a conditional use permit); St. John's Roman
Catholic Church Corp. v. Town of Darien, 184 A.2d 42, 48-49 (Conn. 1962)
(rejecting a variance application); Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of
Jackson, 733 N.W.2d 734, 743-44 (Mich. 2007) (denying a rezoning request); see also
Cordes, supra note 67, at 164-66 (reviewing mechanisms for seeking relief from zoning restrictions). Not coincidentally, these contexts overlap with RLUIPA's jurisdictional trigger, which applies to "individualized land use determinations," instead of to
the provisions of the generally applicable zoning ordinance. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a) (2) (C) (2006).
134 This vision of religious groups is borrowed from Fischel's description of special
interest groups generally as supplicants to homeowner majorities. WILLIAM A. FisCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIs 88-92 (2001). Here, religious groups are not necessarily dependent on local homeowners, but still must seek some affirmatively
favorable treatment from government.
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nizations, discriminating against a religious group by denying what
can at least be characterized as a preference presumably comes at
lower political cost than discriminating through a proactive government measure like condemnation.1 3 5 Although this difference is
more form than substance, the discriminatory impact of denying a
benefit can appear to be less odious than the impact of taking an
affirmative step, even if the results are the same.
Furthermore, examination of any exercise of eminent domain is
usually quite vigorous. Although procedures vary state by state, condemnation commonly involves, first, a requirement of good-faith
negotiations, followed by public hearings, a complaint filed against
the property owner in court, and a subsequent trial or judicial hearing. 13 6 The burden is on the government in such a proceeding to
demonstrate the necessity of the condemnation, its public purpose,
and ultimately the amount of compensation.' 3 7 In preparation, property owners not only have access to the usual tools of discovery but
may also make open records requests, giving access to a trove of information about the government's decisionmaking process.13 8 These
information-forcing mechanisms do not prevent abusive eminent
domain practices, but they increase condemnation's visibility and the
transparency of the condemnation process.
Because of its relative rarity and higher visibility, condemnation
has more political salience than a local government's exercise of its
generic zoning power.1 39 As Professor Fischel trenchantly explains,
there is a "popular revulsion" at the questionable use of condemna135 For one application of the effect of framing on political saliency, consider Colorado's effort to amend its constitution to prohibit extending favorable treatment to
gays and lesbians. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (striking down the
amendment). This amendment, while rightly characterized as discriminatory, see id.
at 635, was nevertheless shrewdly constructed to minimize political opposition.
136 See, e.g., NewJersey Eminent Domain Act of 1971, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3-8-12
(1997); New York Eminent Domain Procedure Law, N.Y. EM. Dom. PROC. LAW
§§ 201-207 (2003 & Supp. 2009); see also COMMUNITY OUTREACH COMM., AM. BAR
Ass'N, ILLINOIS MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AND EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURES

(2004),

available at http://www.abanet.org/rppt/cmtes/standing-committees/community/
IllinoisMortgageForeclosure.pdf; California Eminent Domain Law Group, The California Eminent Domain Handbook, http://www.eminentdomainlaw.net/property
guide.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
137 See Simon H. Bloom & Stephanie E. Dreyer, Preparingfor the Initial Taking of
Possession Hearing,PRAc. REAL EST. LAw., Nov. 2007, at 15, 17.
138 See id. at 17.
139 Garnett cites one study finding that only twenty percent of government acquisitions of property involved eminent domain proceedings. See Garnett, supra note 18,
at 104 n.15 (citing FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., EVALUATION OF
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/cndmst.htm
STATE CONDEMNATION PROCESS,
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tion that can become a "cause cdlibrd' spilling beyond the boundary of
the local government. 40 The public outcry following the Supreme
Court's decision in Kelo is a particularly stark example, but nevertheless just one example, of the political opposition to eminent
domain.141

Even if political and economic barriers to eminent domain do
not prevent a particular instance of discriminatory condemnation, the
judicial review process we described above, with its information-forcing mechanisms, is more likely to effectively uncover bias than is judicial review of zoning. 142 This is true in the context of large
municipalities as well as smaller towns. On the other hand, of course,
religious discrimination may well find its way in the door and go undetected under traditional constitutional review. There is, undeniably, a
history of abusive and even discriminatory condemnation in this country, particularly in the urban redevelopment programs-sometimes
called "slum clearance"-from the 1950s and '60s, although those
were followed by statutory reforms cracking down on the most abusive
uses of eminent domain. 14 3 This much, however, is clear: the politics
and economics of condemnation make religious discrimination less
(last visited Oct. 1, 2009)); see also BERLINER, supra note 101 (providing state-by-state
survey of condemnation actions).
140 FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 74.
141 Kelo v. City of New London, 454 U.S. 469 (2005). There are innumerable
examples of condemnations creating local political opposition, only some of which
reach the national stage. Two leading examples from opposite coasts include current
efforts to condemn property in Brooklyn to create, inter alia, a new stadium for the
NewJersey Nets basketball team, see Nicholas Confessore, Blight, Like Beauty, Can Be in
the Eye of the Beholder, N.Y. TIMES,July 25, 2006, at Bl, and the condemnation of Chdvez
Ravine for the Los Angeles Dodgers in the 1960s, see Rv COODER, CHAVEz RAVINE
(Nonesuch Records 2005).
142 See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
143 See Wendell E. Pritchett, The "PublicMenace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 34-35 (2003) (describing
discriminatory slum clearance during the 1950s in Chicago). The principal statutory
reform responding to the problems of urban renewal came from the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Federally
Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2006) (originally enacted as Act ofJan. 2,
1971, § 101, 84 Stat. 1894). See Garnett, supra note 18, at 121-24; Marc B. Mihaly,
Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and Public-PrivateEconomic Redevelopment, 34 EcoLoGY
L.Q. 1, 14 (2007) ("The Uniform Act responded to the public outcry after the government used eminent domain in the 1940s to 1960s to remove urban blight."). Many of
these particular statutes may not directly protect religious property because most
apply specifically to compensation for residences and businesses. See Garnett, supra
note 18, at 121-24 (describing federal and state relocation acts). Nevertheless, they
demonstrate the increased political attention paid to eminent domain practices of the
past.
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likely here than in the context of zoning and other regulatory land
use controls.1 44
It is important to observe, too, that the harm from discriminatory
condemnation is arguably smaller than from discriminatory zoning.
Both may have the effect of excluding a religious group from a community, but at least in the latter, the group receives compensation. It
may not be compensation that serves to make the group truly whole; it
may exclude entire categories of real harms.' 4 5 Nevertheless, it provides more than discriminatory zoning, the exclusionary effect of
which comes with no remedy at all.14 6
C.

The Costs of Limiting Condemnation

A prophylactic rule is, by its nature, overbroad. It reflects an
implicit judgment that the costs of overprotection are lower than the
costs of underprotection.14 7 As the previous section argued, the costs
of underprotection against religious discrimination are lower for condemnation than for zoning actions like variance and other permit
denials. This is half the equation. The other half is important, too, as
the costs of thwarting condemnation are higher, in general, than the
costs of limiting governments' zoning power. A prophylactic rule
hampering condemnation is therefore both less valuable and more
costly than zoning prophylaxis. That equation strongly militates
against extending RLUIPA to eminent domain.

144 The history of discriminatory zoning is even more problematic. Early zoning
ordinances zoned explicitly based on race. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82
(1917) (invalidating a Louisville, Kentucky segregation ordinance); In re Sing, 43 F.
Supp. 359, 359-61 (N.D. Cal. 1890) (striking down San Francisco's "Bingham Ordinance," which required people of Chinese ancestry to live in designated areas).
Ongoing discrimination in zoning is a widely discussed phenomenon. See generallyJ.
Gregory Richards, Zoningfor DirectSocial Control, 1982 DuKE L.J. 761, 767-835 (discussing various types of discrimination in zoning).
145 For a discussion of the damages routinely excluded from compensation
awards, see Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MIcH. ST. L. REV.
957, 962-67;James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, PublicRuses, 2004 MicH. ST. L. REV.
859, 865-73; Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 677, 682-704 (2005).
146 Saxer relies on a similar insight to argue for extending RLUIPA to eminent
domain. In her view, the existence of compensation means courts will be less willing
to find that condemnation has impermissibly burdened a religious group. Saxer,
supra note 24, at 673-74, 695. We agree, but reach exactly the opposite conclusion.
147 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing prophylactic rules).
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1. The Comparative Costs of Zoning and Condemnation
The costs of limiting local government zoning authority over
religious property are admittedly quite high. Most profoundly, religious land uses can implicate many of the core justifications for zoning
authority: separating incompatible uses and preserving property values.14 8 Religious land uses, whether for a place of worship or a secondary use, can generate traffic and noise.14 9 They can bring outsiders
into a neighborhood on a regular and ongoing basis. Even without
religious discrimination, the presence of unfamiliar outsiders can
increase distrust and decrease comfort levels within a community.
Moreover, the introduction of any nonresidential use into a residential community can be a harbinger of more profound change, threatening to begin a transformation into more of a mixed-use
community.o5 0 All of this will predictably reduce nearby property values and the subjective use values that people have in their property. 15 1
This is not just a problem for individual property owners, either.
It is also potentially a problem for a local government and for a community more generally. Local governments are, by and large,
engaged in fierce competition with each other to be good places to
live and do business.' 5 2 Both the cause and the effect of this interlocal competition is to enhance property values.s5 3 High property values signal that a community is a desirable place to live, and that it is
providing a desirable mix of public services and property taxes. Good
148 See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and PotentialPitfalls
of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 247, 254 (2000) ("The
primary purposes of zoning are to provide for orderly development and to protect
property values and human health by segregating incompatible land uses ...
149 HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 78-81.
150 Id. at 79. The costs are clearest in the context of residential neighborhoods,
but exist, too, in mixed-use and commercial neighborhoods. There, the presence of
religious uses may again increase traffic and burden scarce consumer parking
resources, to the detriment of local businesses. Moreover, some religious uses,
whether a place of worship or a school, may be more sensitive to some of the noise
and congestion created in mixed-use neighborhoods potentially leading to conflicts
with neighbors. See Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846,
851-52 (7th Cir. 2007) (considering consequences of allowing church in industrial
zone).
151 See, e.g., HlAMILTON, supra note 7, at 79-81 (arguing that churches can change
the character of a neighborhood and reduce property values).
152 See FISCHEL, supra note 134, at 59-60; Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law:
Adjusting the Scale ofProperty Protection,107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 899 n.71 (2007) (citing
sources); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,64J. POL. ECON. 416,
422 (1956).
153 Serkin, supra note 11, at 1655.
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schools, low crime, and smart land use planning are all capitalized
into property values, as are the property taxes used to fund these services.15 4 When the mix is right, this generates demand for local housing, serving to maintain property values. This translates into a
powerful political force since homeowners are motivated to ensure
that property values remain high.15 5 When exempting some religious
land uses from local zoning has the effect of decreasing local property
values-or merely has the potential to decrease local property values-this is likely to impact a local government's competition with
neighboring towns, and may well have significant political costs for
local politicians, regardless of their responsibility. These are high
costs, indeed.
The costs of presumptively exempting religious land uses from
condemnation that substantially burdens religion are even higher,
however. Allowing religious groups to resist condemnation threatens
to force governments to change the location of roads, parks, and
other municipal infrastructure to avoid religious property. This is not
idle speculation. Religious groups have already invoked RLUIPA,
although not always successfully, in order to prevent the expansion of
a park,15 6 an extension of O'Hare airport, 15 7 the development of
unused land into a Costco,s5 8 and an addition to a substance abuse
facility.159 In a case presently pending in the Southern District of New
York, a religious congregation has invoked RLUIPA to stop development of a municipal garage in Brooklyn.16 0 Notably, if RLUIPA had
existed in the 1970s, it might have provided religious groups with a de
facto veto over Detroit's controversial condemnation of a neighborhood to allow expansion of a General Motors plant in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.16 1 While the allocation of
154 FiSCHEL, supra note 134, at 81.
155 For most homeowners, the house is their single largest investment, and anything adversely affecting its value is of substantial concern. See Serkin, supranote 11,
at 1648.
156 Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251-52
(W.D.N.Y. 2005).
157 St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 634 (7th Cir.
2007).
158 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1214 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
159 Christian Romany Church Ministries v. Broward County, 980 So. 2d 1164, 1166
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
160 See Complaint at 17, Congregation Adas Yereim v. City of N.Y., No. 07-CV-2244
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2007).
161 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). See Fischel, supra note 110, at 940 (identifying
two substantial Catholic churches condemned for the project).
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responsibility to define "public use" is complex and contested, no one
has seriously argued that churches should be given a potential veto
over such large-scale redevelopment.
Two caveats are in order before we go further. First, we do not
claim that every instance in which a zoning action is thwarted will be
less costly than every instance in which a condemnation is prevented,
but only that on balance a widespread restriction on condemnation
will reduce overall welfare more dramatically than an analogous
restriction on zoning and landmarking. It is possible to imagine a
case in which failing to zone is costlier than not being able to condemn, but the fact remains that on the whole, hobbling a government's condemnation power with respect to religious assemblies will
be costlier than restricting its zoning authority.
Second, we recognize that RLUIPA would by no means defeat
every governmental attempt to condemn property. For RLUIPA's
compelling interest test to apply, a condemnation would have to
impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. This threshold
requirement has at least some teeth. 6 2 The Ninth Circuit, for example, has rejected a RLUIPA claim based on denial of a rezoning
request because the city's regulations did not "render religious exercise effectively impracticable."16 3 Under this standard, no substantial
burden exists so long as a religious group has a reasonable opportunity to pursue its religious activity elsewhere in the municipality. The
Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, adopted a far broader interpretation of the statute, finding a substantial burden where there is "delay,
uncertainty, and expense." 16 4 The religious group in that case was not
required to show that its religious activities also could not have
occurred elsewhere in the municipality; being denied use of its own
property was burden enough.165 Still other courts have articulated
different standards. 6 6 Coupled with this uncertainty, we recognize,
162 For a summary of recent case law, see Shelby D. Green, Zoning In and Out
Churches: Limits on MunicipalZoning Powers by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 37 RFAL EsT. L.J. 163, 166-74 & nn.50-92 (2008).
163 San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir.
2004).
164 Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church v. City of New Berlin, 396
F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005).
165 Id. ("That the burden would not be insuperable would not make it insubstantial."); see also Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1203, 1226-27 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding substantial burden where church
was prevented from developing its property and it would be difficult to find a sufficiently large alternative site in the area).
166 See, e.g., Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding substantial burden in prisoner context where "a follower is forced to choose between
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too, that imposing a compelling interest requirement will not actually
defeat every governmental attempt to condemn, because some takings
will satisfy that standard.
Nevertheless, these same limits apply to RLUIPA's core zoning
provisions: the regulation must impose a substantial burden and the
resulting strict scrutiny may not be fatal in fact. We argue only that
whatever legal standard applies, RLUIPA's costs will tend to be higher
in the context of condemnation than in zoning. And, at least at the
margins, a significant number of governmental exercises will actually
be stopped. Some of these would doubtless have been net positive
public projects. All we need to show, and all we mean to argue, is that
imposing a presumption of illegality when it comes to religious property will hamstring the exercise of eminent domain to some extent,
and that doing so is likely to entail costs that tend to be even more
significant than as applied to zoning.
2.

Holdouts

In reality, the effect of allowing religious groups to resist condemnation is somewhat complex. The traditional economic justification
for eminent domain is to prevent holdouts.16 7 In the absence of condemnation, each individual property owner could hold out for some
share of the surplus being created by the government project. The
extent to which holdouts are a problem depends on a variety of factors. In a competitive market, where the government has its choice of
property to acquire, holdouts pose little threat.16 8 But in thin markets, where the government needs a particular property, the owner
can seek to extract some or all of the surplus being created by the
government.16 9 Even this situation, though, should not threaten the
viability of the project. If the property truly is more valuable to the
government than to the property owner, the ability to hold out will
have distributional consequences-the government will pay morebut the parties should be able to negotiate a sale.
This all changes as soon as multiple owners have the ability to
hold out. Now, each property owner may seek to extract some of the
following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits .. . and abandoning one
of the precepts of his religion"); Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, 06-cv3217, 2007 WL 2904194, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007) (applying Klem standard in land
use context).
167 See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw § 3.7 (6th ed. 2003).
168 Merrill, supra note 18, at 76-78 (contrasting "thick" and "thin" markets).
169 Id. at 65 ("[Elminent domain's purpose is to overcome barriers to voluntary
exchange created when a seller of resources is in position to extract economic rents
from a buyer.").
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surplus of the government project, and the demands may well exceed
the value of the project to the government. 17 0 If there are enough
individual owners, they will have trouble coordinating their negotiations with the government and even agreements that would benefit
everyone may not be struck.17 1 Now, instead of altering the purchase
price of the property, the ability to hold out means the government
project may not happen at all. Condemnation is frequently justified
as preventing this obviously inefficient situation.17 2
Importantly, though, protecting religious groups from condemnation does not appear to raise this latter, more significant concern.
The chances are small of any condemnation including so many different religious groups that they are unable to coordinate their negotiations with the government. Moreover, it is useful to distinguish
between good faith and strategic holdout value. A religious group
may refuse to sell either because the property is genuinely worth more
to the group than the government is offering, or strategically to
extract more money from the government. The former, again, is not
problematic for the efficient allocation of property. If property is
worth more to the religious group than the government is willing to
pay, the government should not condemn it.
The problem, fundamentally, is distinguishing between good
faith and strategic holdouts. If owners could be limited to demanding
in compensation only what the property is genuinely worth to them,
there would be no need, or at least less need, for eminent domain.1 7 3
170 For examples of this phenomenon, see MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK EcoNomy 1-16 (2008).
171 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcnON 53-57 (1965). It is
partly for this reason that Heller and Hills proposed a mechanism for coordinating
negotiations with the government. See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly
Distnicts, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1465, 1472-74 (2008).
172 See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More
Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 572 (1993); Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public
Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A RationaleBased on Secret Purchasesand Private
Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 21 (2006); Krier & Serkin, supra note 145, at 870.
There are, of course, other more normative justifications, too. For example, a number of people have argued that individual property owners should not be entitled to
any of the surplus created by public projects because this amounts to an unjustified
transfer of wealth from the public to an individual private owner who has done nothing to create the value of the project.
173 A number of scholarly proposals seek to create this scenario. See, e.g., Heller &
Hills, supra note 171, at 1488-1527 (proposing "land assembly districts"); Saul
Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771,
789-90 (1982). Even so, there may still be some need for eminent domain if property
owners should not necessarily be entitled to be made truly whole. See Katrina Wyman,
The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 239, 251 (2007) (suggesting
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Against this backdrop, people may have an intuition that religious
groups are less likely than other private actors to engage in strategic
bargaining with the government. This, however, seems overly
optimistic.
It may well be that some congregations' public mindedness will
lead them to engage in more forthright dealing with the government,
but this is not necessarily true. Many religious groups are sophisticated economic actors with their own very private agendas. Garnett's
account of the Roman Catholic Church in Chicago depicts a fairly
sophisticated political actor, accustomed to bargaining with government. 1 7 4 Though the church there seemed motivated only by a desire
to protect its local communities, it is not entirely fanciful to think that
some religious groups may acquire property precisely for its strategic
holdout value. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton,17 5 in fact, provides an example in which a church acquired its property after the
town had issued a comprehensive plan that recommended acquiring
the land, through condemnation if necessary.1 7 6 It is easy enough to
imagine some religious groups using their ability to resist condemnation to stop controversial public-private development partnerships.
Responding either to the influence of its congregants, or even to its
own sense of social justice, a religious group may well seek to acquire
property within the footprint of some development in order to prevent it from going forward. Without the power to condemn, one wellsituated parcel of religious property could stop an entire development. In fact, it need not even be a parcel; simply an easement or any
other interest in real property could serve this protective function, so
long as its elimination would work a substantial burden on religious
exercise. In other words, even a solitary church or synagogue could
stop worthwhile projects from going forward should RLUIPA extend
presumptive protection against eminent domain.

that just compensation need not compensate for condemnees' "subjective perception
of their losses").
174 See Garnett, supra note 18, at 111-15. This sophistication around property is
presumably not limited to the Catholic Church, or even to traditional, mainstream
religions. Cf Mark Wellborn, Church of Scientology Buys More Harlem Property, N.Y.
OBSERVER, Aug. 6, 2007, http://www.observer.com/2007/church-scientology-buysmore-property-125th-street (describing $10 million purchase of property in Harlem
by the Church of Scientology).
175 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
176 Id. at 251. Afterward, when the town announced its decision to condemn, the
church claimed to be surprised. Id. at 251-52.
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Inverse Condemnation

Eliminating the government's ability to condemn religious property has another potential effect, too-one so far overlooked in the
RLUIPA literature. It threatens to transform the remedy for inverse
condemnation actions from routine damages for reductions in property value to injunctions prohibiting the government from acting at
all. Not only is this a potentially significant change in the limits of
government regulation, in some situations its results are
unintelligible.
Inverse condemnation is a state law action that allows a property
owner to recover just compensation for a taking of her property. It is
a state law mechanism for alleging a regulatory taking where the government has not affirmatively exercised its power of eminent domain
and involves a claim that the government has effectively taken property without compensation.1 7 7 In fact, federal ripeness doctrines
require property owners to pursue inverse condemnation or its
equivalent in state court before bringing a federal constitutional
claim.178
Any facts giving rise to a regulatory takings claim can be the basis
for an inverse condemnation action. Important for RLUIPA analysis,
though, is the category of takings claims involving cases of physical
invasion by the government, such as airplane overflights, flooding
from rivers, or even groundwater contamination. 17 9 Notice, these are
all regulations that do not otherwise appear to fall within RLUIPA's
definition of zoning or landmarking regulations but that may nevertheless impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. The constitutionally mandated remedy in these cases is just compensation for a
taking of the property, and the owner can bring that claim through
inverse condemnation. 80
What, then, would it mean if government did not have the power
to condemn religious property under RLUIPA? Now, instead of an
action for damages, inverse condemnation should come with property
177 See, e.g., 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 742 (2004) (defining inverse
condemnation).
178 Williamson County Reg'1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
195 (1985).
179 See Albahary v. City of Bristol, 886 A.2d 802, 804 (Conn. 2005) (regarding
groundwater); McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d 1110, 1114-15 (Nev. 2006)
(referring to overflights); City of Keller v. Wilson, No. 2-00-183CV, 2007 WL 1776033,
at *1 (Tex. App. June 21, 2007) (applying to flooding).
180 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987) (requiring availability of compensation for regulatory takings).
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rule protection.18 1 If landing patterns take planes low over a church,
the government may have to reroute them. If a municipal power company's dam floods upstream religious lands, the government may have
to close the dam. It is unclear what this would even mean for inverse
condemnation actions filed after property damage has already
occurred. This is not idle conjecture. The Supreme Court's decision
mandating the availability of damages awards for regulatory takings
came from the flooding of property owned by the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church. 8 2
Maybe these "invasion" situations would survive RLUIPA's standard, but this requires something of a tortured interpretation of the
statute. Raised as a claim before the property damage occurred, the
Army Corps of Engineers may well be unable to demonstrate that the
location of a new dam, for example, is necessary for a compelling government purpose. When flooding occurs and a religious group brings
a claim after that fact, what could transform the same underlying conduct so that it now overcomes a presumption of illegality? There is no
good answer to this question. Restricting governments' condemnation power over a category of property not only limits outright condemnation but affects much broader regulatory powers, too.
Applying RLUIPA to condemnation would have far-reaching consequences, allowing religious groups to engage in rent-seeking from
the government to extract holdout value and some of the surplus created from government actions. It is easy to imagine in many instances
that the ability of religious groups to resist condemnation would prevent some government projects from happening at all. While the
costs of RLUIPA in limiting local governments' zoning power are
already very high, the costs in the context of condemnation are higher
still. Compared to zoning, there is both much less of a need for
RLUIPA to apply to condemnation, and the costs of doing so are
higher. RLUIPA should therefore not apply to condemnation.
III.

RLUIPA As LIAuimrry RULE

Concluding that RLUIPA does not apply to condemnation suggests a new way of conceptualizing RLUIPA's protection for religious
land uses. So long as local governments retain condemnation as a
backstop, RLUIPA does not prevent local governments from zoning
religious property so much as it mandates compensation. To put this
181 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rubs, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1105-09 (1972) (defining
property and liability rules).
182 First English, 482 U.S. at 318-19.
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in terms of Calabresi and Malamed's famous formula, it transforms
what appears to be property rule protection for religious groups into a
kind of liability rule protection.1 8 3 This, in turn, puts some power
back in local governments' hands, recasting zoning immunity as a
weaker form of resistance.1 8 4
Surprisingly, this may represent an appealing compromise
between RLUIPA advocates and opponents.18 5 Those who argue that
religious uses ought to be exempt from all land use regulation will at
least be able to extract payment when the government acts against
religious landowners, even though officials are rarely required to provide compensation for land use regulations that apply to other
groups. And those who believe that religious entities should be subject to the same land use regulations as other groups will take comfort
from the thought that governments retain their power over local land
use, subject to payment of compensation. Neither group is likely to be
pleased by this solution, but that may be to its credit. This much at
least is clear: inviting the use of condemnation to avoid application of
RLUIPA's zoning provisions changes the stakes of land use disputes
with religious groups and restores some balance to the interaction
between such groups and local governments.18 6
RLUIPA's proponents will undoubtedly worry that allowing condemnation of religious property invites an end run around RLUIPA's
core protection. Allowing the government to zone, so long as it pays,

183 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 181, at 1089; Merrill, supra note 18, at 74
("[E]minent domain provides a mechanism that allows government to convert property rules into liability rules.").
184 Ellickson has provided one of the most thoroughgoing discussions of the benefits of liability rule protection for land use regulations. See Ellickson, supra note 108,
at 410-22.
185 We do not view this implication of our proposal to be a first-best solution that
would necessarily be desirable in an ideal world. Rather, we argue more narrowly that
given the durable reality of RLUIPA's rules concerning zoning and landmarkingprovisions that are not likely to be repealed under current political conditions-transforming RLUIPA's core zoning provisions from something resembling a property rule
into a safeguard that more closely approximates a liability rule blunts some of the
most serious criticisms of the existing statute while continuing to offer congregations
significant protection that would not be available in a world without RLUIPA.
186 Ellickson, however, has argued that liability rule protection is inappropriate
protection against religious discrimination. See Ellickson, supra note 108, at 416-18.
RLUIPA changes the dynamic that concerns him, however, in which local governments can discriminate with impunity. Here, the liability rule protection we propose
is modifying a substantially different background rule, that local governments cannot
regulate religious property at all.
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seems to fly in the face of the RLUIPA's prophylactic character.18 7 Yet
it is important to understand that under our proposal RLUIPA would
not exactly protect religious groups with liability rule protection-it
would do quite a bit more. To see this, think again of Oregon's Measure 37. That law requires governments in Oregon to pay whenever
their land use regulations reduce property values.' 8 8 It truly protects
property owners from zoning with a liability rule, requiring compensation for any decrease in market value. Our RLUIPA proposal is different. In order to subject religious property to land use controls, local
governments would have to affirmatively condemn the property and
pay its full value. It would still prevent local governments from zoning
religious groups-unless they can offer a compelling interest-but it
would allow what amounts to an escape valve. Exercising that option
would entail all of the political and economic costs that accompany
condemnation.
Even so, RLUIPA proponents may view this as scant protection. If
the government can condemn the property, it can then always reconvey it to secular owners, recapturing the property's fair market value
but now subjecting it to land use controls. In other words, the effect
may be to force local governments to pay only the diminution in value
resulting from the zoning, which may be a small price, indeed.18 9 Proponents may worry governments will do this all the time.
There are three responses to this concern. First, requiring compensation only for diminution in value is still robust protection. After
all, zoning often not only thwarts religious use, but also weakens the
market for secular uses of the property (think for instance of regulations limiting the size of parking lots or capping the height of buildings). The response to Oregon's Measure 37 reveals how
consequential a requirement to compensate for diminution in value
can be. Forced to pay to zone, most governments simply do not
zone. 190
187 This concern, in fact, is at the heart of the view identified in Part I that
RLUIPA applies to condemnation only when undertaken to avoid application of
RLUIPA's core zoning provisions. See supra Part IC.
188 OR. REv. STAT. § 197.305(1) (2007). This is subject to important limitations,
the most important of which is that transfers in ownership eliminate claims under
Measure 37. Id. at 3; see also supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (explaining
the details of Measure 37).
189 Notice that the government could not reconvey the property to a religious
group or it would find itself in the same bind, unable to enforce land use regulations
against the owner of the property because of RLUIPA's zoning provisions.
190 See Caroline E.K MacLaren, Oregon at a Crossroads: Where Do We Go from Here?,
36 ENVrL. L. 53, 58 (2006); see also text accompanying note 116 (noting this lack of
regulation).
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Second, condemnation as a process is more costly than zoning, as
discussed above. 9 1 The administrative costs around condemnation
are high, and local governments will not be able to recapture those
costs simply by reconveying condemned property at fair market value.
Finally, local governments may have to pay more than fair market
value to acquire religious property. 19 2 Although compensation is usually pegged to the property's fair market value, churches and places of
worship often constitute special-use properties that can be subject to
their own compensation rules.19 3 For such property, the government
must often pay an amount adequate to allow the owner to recreate the
special use in a different location.19 4 In effect, displaced owners of
special-use property can receive its replacement value, rather than just
fair market value.19 5 Assuming the government will not be able to
capture this higher value if it turns around and resells the property to
a secular buyer, the difference between the property's replacement
value to the religious group and fair market value in a consensual
transaction with a secular buyer is an additional loss to the government that makes condemnation a costly escape valve.
Given all of these costs, RLUIPA opponents may argue that condemnation is no real option at all and does not genuinely minimize
the force of RLUIPA's application to zoning. We are inclined to
agree. The practical difficulty of condemnation means that most
religious land use will still benefit from the Act's protections. Nevertheless, the opportunity to condemn religious property does have
some practical consequences that at least diminish the costs of
RLUIPA's prophylactic application to zoning.
191 See supra Part II.B.
192 See supra note 110.
193 See Congregation of the Sons of Israel v. State, 387 N.Y.S.2d 738, 739-40 (App.
Div. 1976) (awarding replacement value for synagogue); Serkin, supra note 145, at
724-25 (discussing replacement value); see also Saxer, supra note 24, at 692-94 (discussing when the "substitute facilities" doctrine applies to religious property).
194 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12C.01 [3] [d] (3d ed.
2006) (citing State v. Twp. of S. Hackensack, 322 A.2d 818, 823 (N.J. 1974)), cited in
Saxer, supra note 24, at 692 n.279.
195 See Garnett, supra note 18, at 122-23. In one case study, Garnett found that
property owners who negotiated with the government received, on average, 157% of
the appraised value of their property in total compensation. Id. at 134. A significant
proportion of total compensation came in the form of relocation assistance, including
compensation for the difference between the condemned property and replacement
property. Her study may well not be applicable to religious property, but it does illustrate in a detailed way the mechanisms by which various realities-legal, political, and
economic-can drive up the total costs of condemnation.
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Most importantly, having condemnation theoretically available
may be all it takes to alter the bargaining dynamic between local governments and religious groups. Religious groups can, after all, voluntarily agree to abide by any land use restrictions. In fact, the zoning
and planning process is often characterized by ongoing dealing
between local governments and property owners to arrive at a regulatory regime that is acceptable to both.19 6 Under RLUIPA's zoning
provisions, religious groups have little incentive to grant any concessions to local zoning authorities. But with the threat of condemnation
in the background, they may at least be brought to the bargaining
table.19 7
Negotiations are still heavily skewed to favor the religious group
largely because local governments lack flexible threats. Their fallback
is condemnation, a kind of land use nuclear option that cannot be
exercised, or even threatened, very often with any kind of credibility.
This threat of condemnation seemingly raises the stakes of the dispute, and may not be a bargaining strategy conducive to amicable
agreements. Nevertheless, RLUIPA is itself something of a nuclear
option for religious groups, and one that they have been able to
invoke to date with relatively little risk. Putting condemnation on the
table may result in religious groups agreeing to more zoning and land
use restrictions than they otherwise would. In this land use arms race,
the parties may well blink and reach a negotiated compromise.
Conceptualizing condemnation as a backstop or safety valve for
local governments when religious groups resist zoning is directly at
odds with the intermediate view, described above, that RLUIPA does
not apply to eminent domain unless a local government is using condemnation to circumvent RLUIPA's restrictions on zoning religious
property.1 9 8 We, however, are inviting local governments to use (or to
threaten to use) condemnation in precisely these situations, at least
when the stakes for the local government are sufficiently high. This is
196 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics,10 J. LAND USE & ENvrTL. L.
45, 81 (1994) ("Rather than conceiving of zoning as consisting of legislative-type
rules, we should understand zoning as establishing mere presumptions or baseline
rules that precipitate and provide a convenient substantive starting point for negotiations between developers and representatives of neighborhood interests."); see also

Carol M. Rose, Planningand Dealing:Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REv. 837, 841 (1983) (characterizing land decisions as "deals with
landowners and developers").
197 In negotiation terms, the opportunity for condemnation changes the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement, increasing the value of settlement to the relig-

ious group. See ROGER

FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO

oTrr GIVING IN 100 (2d ed.1991).
198 See supra Part I.C.
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not an invitation to reintroduce religious discrimination through the
back door.19 9 Carrying through on the threat will put local governments through the crucible of eminent domain, and we expect it to
happen very rarely-so rarely, in fact, that it may be little protection
for local governments at all. Still, understanding the relationship
between the political economy of eminent domain and the use of liability rule protection to overcome religious zoning holdouts demonstrates that RLUIPA's costs may not be as high as many people fear.
CONCLUSION

RLUIPA provides religious groups with sweeping protection from
local zoning authority. Whether it also applies to eminent domain
remains unsettled, with courts and commentators seeking sensible
results in difficult cases. Most of these efforts have largely ignored
what, in our view, are the most important differences between zoning
and condemnation: their relative political and economic costs, and
the different opportunities they present for discriminating against
religious groups.
While we take no position here on the proportionality of
RLUIPA's provisions to the problem of religious discrimination in the
zoning context, RLUIPA's best justification is as a prophylactic rule
preventing discrimination that would otherwise be hard to detect.
Because condemnation provides far less opportunity for hidden discrimination, and because the costs of limiting governments' condemnation power over religiously owned property are so high, RLUIPA
should not apply to condemnation. This interpretation of RLUIPA
also provides local governments with an escape hatch to avoid the
most severe applications of RLUIPA's zoning provisions. More impor199 Someone might worry that if a local government tried to pursue an extreme
form of antireligious discrimination using our condemnation safety valve, allowing it
to do so would frustrate Congress's purpose and therefore present a statutory construction obstacle to our proposal. Imagine for instance a locality that wished to prevent all religious use of a particular parcel of land, and used its power of eminent
domain to avoid any difficulties posed by RLUIPA. Congress could not have intended
to allow that sort of end run, according to this view.
Two responses. First, we think that such extreme instances will be rare in practice, and that Congress may well have thought that they could be combated through
the ordinary procedural protections that have long been afforded to landowners facing condemnation. Second, Congress may well have realized that such strong forms
of discrimination would trigger constitutional prohibitions-as they almost certainly
would-and that those prohibitions would be relatively easy to enforce, given the
political dynamics of eminent domain. We are grateful to Kent Greenawalt for helpful conversation regarding this problem.
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tantly, too, the background threat of condemnation may restore some
power to local governments in negotiating sensible land use policies
with religious groups.

